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"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—St. Vincent of Lerins, *Commonit, c. 6.*

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JAMES CARDINAL GIBBONS,

First Chancellor of the Catholic University.

The
Catholic University Bulletin.

Vol. XVII. *October, 1911.* *No. 7.*

CARDINAL GIBBONS AND THE UNIVERSITY.

The rejoicings on the occasion of the double jubilee of Cardinal Gibbons find nowhere a more responsive echo than in the Catholic University of America. In the chapters of history that will one day exhibit the main course of Catholic life and thought in the United States during the latter quarter of the nineteenth and the first quarter of the twentieth century, Cardinal Gibbons will necessarily stand forth as the prelate who more widely and permanently than any other affected the minds and hearts of the American Catholic people. In his long episcopal life he has never ceased to be the *dux verbi*, has never failed to administer to its fullest capacity his high office as a principal exponent of Catholic truth in its relations to our own time and people, our own moral and social problems, our domestic needs and duties. So true is this that no one disputes his right to be heard with reverent attention when it is question of the larger and more vital interests of American Catholicism, those interests that concern its future in this nation, the character and lines of its influence on the new race that is now forming amid the most wonderful political and social conditions yet known to mankind.

As missionary-priest and bishop in remote and prejudiced parts of our country; as metropolitan of the mother-see of our extensive hierarchy; as a prince of the Church and authoritative adviser of the papacy; as a prelate during whose career

American Catholicism has reached the height of its development and public influence; as an American ecclesiastic more widely and intimately than any other cognizant of the conditions, needs and ideals of our Church; as an active citizen whose personal acquaintance and influence in the highest circles is without parallel; as a religious writer of world-wide authority and power, he can claim the right to speak as our Nestor and to point out to the Catholic Church in the United States not only the dangers to be avoided but also the ways it must follow if it would maintain its growth and round out the rich promise of its first century.

It is significant, therefore, that his long and active ministry should culminate in the work of the Catholic University; that to the creation and development of a specifically Catholic higher education he should have devoted the supreme efforts of a particularly crowded and energetic career. In this, too, he is distinctively American, since in the last fifty years no feature of our national life is more marked than the devotion to higher education, the numerous monumental evidences of which are conspicuous in every section of the United States. More strongly than any one else the Cardinal has voiced the just sentiment of our Catholic clergy and laity that the heart of a great Catholic University should be a theological school of the highest order, fed and sustained by other excellent schools of philosophy, jurisprudence, languages, literature, the natural sciences and the fine arts, so that in coming generations nothing shall be lacking in the way of academic equipment, from a religious or intellectual point of view, to the typical Catholic scholar, priest or layman. In company with the leading minds of the Church he has felt most profoundly the need of Catholic leaders in every department of our American thought and activity, so that in the crises of the future the incalculably beneficent influence of the Church may not be lost to our American society for want of organs through which to reach a people peculiarly fitted to exhibit one day to the world all the forces of social regeneration and moral elevation that are ever latent in Catholicism, a religion essentially of life,

growth, and manifold attainment wherever it breathes its native air of freedom.

The first Chancellor of the Catholic University has been from its opening so intimately and helpfully united with the great enterprise in all its phases that he may with justice be awarded the foremost place not alone of honor but also of accomplishment. From the beginning he was the guide and the friend of the small body of devoted men who brought the project before the American Catholic people, with ardent eloquence enthused and persuaded them, and ceased not until it was realized, at least in such essentials of a great school of universal learning as may reasonably be asked from the generation that witnesses its birth. And when the work began his patient but resolute and steady spirit sustained and united the directors, encouraged the professors and students, heartened and comforted the administration, and communicated to all his own persuasion that so holy an enterprise, on which hung so many high and noble hopes, could not fail amid so generous a people, a clergy so numerous, devoted and active, and at the very dawn of a new Catholic life. He has always welcomed every act of good will, or useful suggestion, every manifestation of interest in the University, and has at all times thrown in its favor the weight of his unique influence. No one has been more thoroughly persuaded of the necessity of a great Catholic seat of learning at the National Capital, growing with each generation in power and splendor, attracting from decade to decade manifold devotion and generosity, and eventually ranking by every academic title with the proudest creations of our Catholic past. Nor has any one been more firmly persuaded of the possibility of such a great work or of its actual timeliness. He has lived to see a fair realization of the plans and hopes of the first days, to behold a widespread acceptance of the noble and fertile idea by the American Catholic people, and to know that the prospects of larger growth in the near future are very encouraging. He has lived to behold an imminent unification of all Catholic educational interests under the guidance of the American hierarchy through the University established and sustained

by them, the very ideal of its noble founder Leo XIII. Under Cardinal Gibbons the University has become not only a large school with its regular output of academic results, but also a new and influential centre of social service to our holy religion. Our growing Catholic activities in education and charity, in the foreign missions, in social economics, in the arts and along other useful and elevating lines, already find in the University a sympathetic centre admirably located, and variously equipped to further all such ideals by inspiration and suggestion as well as by scientific direction, regularity and centralization of effort.

Few Catholic enterprises of a large character escape a period of trials and difficulties proportioned to the importance of their scope. Nor were such wanting in the early life of the University, grave and numerous enough to threaten its existence while retarding its growth, checking the original current of sympathy and generosity, and saddening hearts that had conceived the highest hopes of its future usefulness in the great spiritual and intellectual warfare that extends about us on all sides, and broadens menacingly from day to day. But the Cardinal never lost courage, nor allowed that of his brethren in the episcopate to weaken. In the darkest hour he manfully took the lead and by voice and pen stimulated and encouraged not only the hierarchy but also the professors and students, and by his annual appeals touched the hearts of the entire Catholic people and kept them acquainted with the nature and purposes of a Catholic University. On all sides he rallied new friends to the support of the enterprise, pointed out more urgently than ever its rich promise, secured generous donations, and breathed into the situation a new life that has not ceased to put forth regularly fresh evidences of vigor and viability. Amid painful vicissitudes the University profited by the universal esteem in which the Cardinal was held. His protection was a tower of strength, and it was felt on all sides that the institution which had cost him so much anxiety and concern must appear to him as fundamental in the new life of the American Catholic Church.

The great rôle of our country in the new political and social order that has now so widely supplanted the conditions of a previous age, has been seized by no one, perhaps, more fully or been more constantly and happily emphasized than by Cardinal Gibbons. Similarly no one has seized more accurately the new and helpful rôle of the Catholic Church as the natural friend and ally of the great republic to which it owes, on so vast a scale and in such fulness, the freedom denied it in other nations whose public titles to consideration and honor were first earned in its school. But institutions work through men, and the future continuance of the amicable and mutually serviceable relations of our country and our Catholic Faith all largely depend on the wisdom of those to whom the highest interests of the latter are confided. Hence the importance of a superior education for the Catholic clergy and for an ever increasing proportion of the Catholic laity. Religion and patriotism are natural allies and only when ignorance or malice separates them do we behold the evil consequences of their divorce. The common education in our Catholic University of so many chosen representatives of the clergy and the laity will inevitably create, in due time, a body of Catholic priests and laymen intimately acquainted with the nature and the ideals of Catholicism and similarly with the nature and the ideals of the American State. In this central school of the Church they will imbibe, amid the most favorable surroundings, a sincere devotion to their Catholic Faith and an ardent love for their fatherland that now stands in the foremost rank of the great nations of history. With time these profound sentiments will find expression in movements of many kinds, in religious and patriotic deeds, in political, economic and social services of surpassing importance, in immortal triumphs of art and literature, all of them easily traceable to the great school in which zealous and noble hearts had provided for the manifold equipment that now conditions all intellectual progress and without which it is seriously hampered or retarded. In those days no name will stand out more prominently in the annals

of the University than that of James Cardinal Gibbons, to whose devotion, generosity and protection will be largely owing all its forms of success and all its titles to the love and gratitude that are usually bestowed on great institutions of learning, once they have fitted themselves to the popular life and needs.

While the Catholic University joins in the vast acclaim of praise and joy that in Church and State does honor to the unique jubilees of its first Chancellor, it also offers earnest prayers that he may long be spared to witness the fruits of the noble foundation for which he has made so many sacrifices and borne so many trials.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

DR. BOLLING AND HOMERIC ARMOUR.

When I had read, in the spring of 1911, Dr. Bolling's article "Homeric Armour and Mr. Lang," [1] I was eager to rush into the field in defence of myself, and of Professor Van Leeuwen's recent confession of faith, "One Homer, one Iliad." I even covered many sheets of paper with my answer; I laid it aside, looked at it again, and came to the conclusion that but few words were needed.

Dr. Bolling, when he wrote, entertained the misapprehension (pp. 670-671) that, in my book, *Homer and his Age* (1906) I made "an effort to appeal the Homeric Question from expert to popular judgment," and that I addressed "the general English-speaking public." In the name of the Ashmolean, what has popular judgment or the English-speaking public to do with the Homeric Question? I wrote for a few men of education who take a special interest in that great problem, and if I used "a sprightly style of polemic," it was because the opportunity, the astonishing logic of the learned persons whom I oppose, offered irresistible temptations. "The present status of expert opinion" in the camp, or rather the many camps, of the opponents of Homeric Unity,—is chaos. So Blass said in his latest work, so says Professor Van Leeuwen (for thirty years a wanderer in the Wolfian wilderness), and if you would know exactly how chaotic is "the present status of expert opinion" read *The Lay of Dolon* (Macmillan, 1911) by my friend, Mr. Shewan, of St. Andrews.

Meanwhile the special point with which Dr. Bolling deals is Homeric Armour. He professes (p. 673) that he "has nothing new to say upon the subject," and "stands essentially on the position of Robert." Now Robert's book is of 1901, and I write in 1911. Robert modified the views of Reichel,

[1] *Catholic University Bulletin*, October, 1910, pp. 668-708.

and we now know a multitude of archaeological facts which were unknown to Reichel and Robert in 1901. Some of them I knew in 1906, more when I wrote *The World of Homer* (1910), and now I know more than I did in that year.

By way of crushing me quite, Dr. Bolling (p. 673) says that "Cauer simply waives" my book of 1906 "aside,"—as if the opinion of that scholar settled the question. But Cauer does rather worse than "waive aside" the book of Robert which is the key of Dr. Bolling's position. Foreign critic for foreign critic, Dr. Bolling may probably be unaware that Drerup in his *Omero* (1909), prefers my treatment of Homeric Armour to that of Reichel; while one of our most distinguished archæologists, in *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* (June, 1911), vastly prefers mine to that of Drerup! I am not a lone fantastic amateur, and casual man of letters. Our chief archæologists in the field and in the study, Sir Arthur Evans, the founder of the archæology of Minoan Crete; Mr. Hogarth, the excavator of the Dictaean Cave and of Ephesus; Mr. Dawkins, the Head of the British School of Athens, are all favorable to the greater part (not all), of such novel views on Homeric armour and costume as I have ventured to put forward: indeed my ideas are based on their researches, on those of Professor Halbherr at Phaestos, and on a great mass of other evidence which Dr. Bolling ignores.

With Sir Arthur Evans I believe that the Homeric poems were composed in the early post-Mycenaean age; that age of the early overlap of bronze and iron;—between the period of the great folk-wanderings, when (about 1200 B. C. and later) the Vikings from the coasts and isles of the Mediterranean invaded Egypt,—and the dawn of the very early Boeotian art on vases in the manner of the "Dipylon" pottery at Athens. It is the age of the Cypro-Mycenaean relic at Enkomi in Cyprus (now in the British Museum), and while the poet has behind him the great Mycenaean memories transfigured in song and story, throughout his age, and later, the influences of Mycenaean craftsmanship in gold work and bronze work, in ivory and crystal, were still potent, as we know from the evi-

dence of the Aeginetan treasure in our Museum; and from the treasure in the earliest temple at Ephesus, discovered and described by Mr. Hogarth (see the Catalogue, and Mr. Hogarth's book *Ionia and the East*).

As for the relative positions of bronze and iron in Homer, they may be described thus; iron "is used for agricultural instruments" (and for woodmen's axes and for some knives or dirks, not employed in war), "while bronze is retained for weapons and for personal adornment." I pointed out these Homeric uses of the metals (as Helbig had done, though he did not believe that this state of things ever existed), but the words within marks of quotations in the last sentence are from Mr. Macallister's account of what he actually found in a stratum of Gezer, in Palestine. He goes on "Thus we found sickles and hoes of iron, iron arrowheads" (like that of Pandarus in *Iliad*, Book IV), "knives, daggers, bracelets, brooches, pins, and needles of bronze," and "spearheads always in bronze," while knives were now of bronze, now of iron, as in Homer.[2] A Mycenaean bronze sword was also found at Gezer.

Thus, as to bronze for weapons, iron for implements, Homer describes a state of things which has been actual, though not found, so far, in Greece; and in this state of things, this Homeric form of overlap of the two metals, Helbig could not believe.

Dr. Bolling, with Reichel and Robert, finds in Homer the armour of two widely sundered periods; the huge suspended targes,—figure of 8, semi-cylindrical, and oblong,—of late Minoan or Mycenaean art (say 1500-1300 B. C., or later) and the round Ionic buckler worn on the left arm, common on early vases or, say, 750 and later. He says that our duty is to ascertain "from the archæological evidence what sort of armour Homer could possibly have seen with his own eyes," and that I am "unwilling to be bound in this fashion." "For instance we know of no targes that Homer could possibly have seen except the huge targes" (suspended shields) "depicted in Mycenaean art" (p. 677).

[2] *Palestine Exploration Fund*, 1903, pp. 197, 198.

Both the poems, he declares, describe these targes, and also the Ionic round (or oval, or otherwise shaped) buckler worn on the left arm. The epics are thus partly Mycenaean (say 1500-1200) partly Ionic (say 750 and later). But I think that Homer sang in neither period. Moreover, Helbig proves that small bucklers existed in the hands of common spearmen of the late Mycenaean age; his proof is derived from bronze figurines found at Tiryns and Mycenae. In these figurines a warrior in Minoan cincloth holds his right arm up on high, his left is held forward—the former grasped the spear, the latter the buckler. The art of the period in which I place Homer shows suspended targes, some large and circular, some covering the body from neck to below the knees (these are huge suspended shields slightly scooped out at the edges) and there are also suspended oblong shields. All these (and even round bucklers worn on the left arm, which Homer never explicitly mentions) are recorded in the art of the age to which I assign the poet. But Dr. Bolling omits this long period, and never mentions the evidence of its art,—Egyptian, Cyprian, and Boeotian: in the two former at least corslets are also exhibited, as on the relief of the Hittite Amazon at Boghaz Keui. All these things are much earlier than the Ionic corslets of the seventh century, which Dr. Bolling regards as the earliest. Moreover the famous corslet of Menelaus in *Iliad,* Book IV, is not of the Ionic pattern: but on this topic I may refer Dr. Bolling to Miss Stawell's *Homer and the Iliad* and to my *World of Homer;* where the *mitrê* and *zoster* of Menelaus are also discussed and illustrated. My critic never takes any notice of Helbig, *La question mycénéenne,* or of the following studies of Homeric and Minoan armour,—Evans, *Scripta Minoa,* Vol. I, pp. 42, 75 and note; Evans, *Journal of the Anthropological Society,* Vol. XXX (a study of Cypro-Mycenaean antiquities); Halbherr, *Monumenti Antichi,* Vol. XIII, pp. 42, 114, 1903; Ostern, *Die Bewaffung in Homers Ilias,* pp. 68 ff.; Miss Stawell, *Homer and the Iliad,* pp. 206 ff. (1909). Above all Dr. Bolling overlooks the very careful study of the Greek shield, including the shield in the Epics, by Dr. Lippold (1909).

According to Dr. Lippold (*Münchener Archäol. Stud.*, p. 461, *et seqq.* 1909) we have the impression, he says, that Robert and Reichel permit their prepossessions to divert them from the true interpretation of the facts. Their premises imply a gap in our knowledge of the subject. The archaeologists who, like Sir Arthur Evans and Mr. Hogarth, agree with me in dating the epics in the overlap of bronze and iron,—that is during the "Folk-Wanderings" of 1200-1000 B. C.—study the armour of that age of transition. In art,—Egyptian, Cypro-Mycenaean, and Boeotian,—they and Dr. Lippold find examples of numerous types of shield, not merely of huge suspended "Mycenaean" types, and (in Boeotian art) of the Ionic round buckler held on the left arm. The various types would be familiar to the poet of that age, nor need we with Reichel, Robert, and Dr. Bolling, look across a gulf of several centuries to the Ionic period for circular shields, whether suspended by the *telamon*, or held on the left arm or by the left hand.

As regards archaeological evidence for shields that Homer might and probably did see, shields neither Mycenaean nor Ionic, but of the intermediate period, I leave Dr Bolling to study the books of which I offer a list. As for the corselets concerning which he, like his German authorities, makes so many difficulties, and as to the costume described in the Epics, I respectfully advise him to consult the same sources, and especially, as has been said, for the corslet, Miss Stawell's *Homer and the Iliad*, and my *World of Homer*. Working independently, Miss Stawell and I came to precisely the same conclusion, but her statement of them is as much preferable to mine (she has avoided two errors of mine), as her scholarship in the interpretation of the Homeric texts is beyond comparison superior. On the other hand my remarks on Homeric and later costume in *The World of Homer* (a topic not treated by Dr. Bolling), are novel, and, I think (with exceptions as to the very archaic dress of women in Greece), recommend themselves to our archaeologists. But, for the women's dress, I still trust to the testimony of archaic art.

To put the results of my humble studies briefly, Homer

describes not the Minoan, not the Ionic, but a *northern* costume for men in active life; namely the smock and brooched plaid or mantle; and this costume, for men in active life, does not appear either in Mycenaean or Ionic art, to my knowledge. It is of the intermediate period, the period of the introduction of the fibula, the period of the northerners, the Achaeans. As far as my limited reading goes, this important fact has not been observed by Homeric critics. It was a surprise to myself, and from the moment when I noticed the very un-Homeric costume of a Hercules hunting a Centaur, on an extremely archaic gem, I pursued the study of costume in the vases of the British Museum, and in all the reproductions of Ionic and archaic Greek art which were accessible to me. My position, for these and many other reasons, especially on account of Homer's absolutely northern fashion of burial,—with cremation, the urn or *larnax* for the ashes; the chamber which contains the urn; the cairn over all, with its bounding circle of erect stones,—is that the epics were composed in a period neither Mycenaean nor Ionic, though he has copious Mycenaean memories. Dr. Bolling, on the other hand, if I understand him, believes that what is not Ionic in the poems is Mycenaean. If Dr. Bolling will consider the armature of Goliath and Saul in the Books of Samuel, and the passage about the unarmoured Asahel, slain by a thrust of the σαμσωτής,—the spike in the spear-butt,—of the armed Abner, he will perceive that Homeric armour existed in Palestine long before the Ionic age; and apparently in the eleventh century B. C.

Dr. Bolling's statement (p. 696) that, in my part of the translation of the *Iliad* (Lang, Leaf, and Myers), I "strove to conceal a flaw," in my present theory, by "beginning a new paragraph" at a certain point, involves an impossibility. When the translation was written, thirty years ago, neither I, nor Mr. Leaf, nor Mr. Myers dreamed that the question of Homeric armour would arise; and certainly I had no ideas on the subject. In fact the passages on armour, in the translation, have not been corrected in the light of any theories which we, the translators, have since entertained. The translation of μίτρη as "taslets,"

that is *cuisses* or thigh-pieces, is impossible; we borrowed "taslets" from Dugald Dalgetty in Scott's *Legend of Montrose.*

My full reply to Dr. Bolling in matters of detail lies beside me, but I spare the space of *The Catholic University Bulletin,* and the patience of the English-speaking public, which may turn to the books of Miss Stawell, of Mr. Shewan, and to the papers of Professor Scott of the Northwestern University, Illinois, for unexpected light on the language of the Epic. I never (p. 706) assumed that the Homeric poems "are at the very beginning of Epic poetry," they are the culmination of Epic poetry—and they were not made with paste and scissors, by dove-tailing extracts from preëxisting poems of various ages.

* * * * *

I am a most lucky person! I began this essay by asking "What, in the name of the Ashmolean has the English-speaking public to do with the Homeric Question?" As I corrected my type-written paper I received by post two proofs of the amount of interest which that large, lazy public takes in the studies of Dr. Bolling and myself. In *The Quarterly Review* of July (p. 29) Dr. Grundy (an Oxford don) complains that, "amid the distractions of the Homeric Question and other Fairy Stories," I have not been doing the Greek Anthology into English rhymes! Give me pen and paper and the Anthology, and I will rhyme it as much as Dr. Grundy either desires or deserves. The other proof comes from the pen of Father Francis Donelly, S. J., writing in a periodical named *America.* The learned Jesuit says:—

"Mr. Lang's more recent books, however, 'Homer and His Age' (1906) and 'The World of Homer' (1910) are with the exception of a chapter or two wholly given over to archaeology. The former was disheartening enough, but the latter moving among the monsters of mythology and handling the other gruesome subjects in which folk-lore and Comparative Religion delight, is worse still. No blame attaches to Mr. Lang. He deserves the thanks of all lovers of Homer for his vigorous championship of Homer. No one probably regrets

more than he that 'the sacred soil of Ilios is rent with shaft and pit.' He would gladly 'turn and see the stars and hear, like ocean on a western beach, the surge and thunder of the Odyssey.'

"Mr. Lang's heart is felt in his book in many a line of silent protest or what would seem protest, that the enemies of Homer's 'crown of indivisible supremacy' should force him to take such weapons. No lover of Homer but is glad to seem him overcome one after another every enemy who lays a rebellious hand upon that crown. The limbs must sweat in such a conflict, and the hands be soiled that stoop like Homeric heroes to throw the stones of earth against attacking foes. We honor the conflict; we proclaim the hero; we rejoice in the last battle where Mr. Gilbert Murray with his 'Rise of the Greek Epic' (1910) [wrong date] goes down to defeat and has his new theory of 'Expurgation' worsted. But all this can not make us grow enthusiastic over the sweat and the earth. Mr. Lang of the Homeric sonnets is more to our liking. When we read his sonnets we want to read Homer; when we read his books we cannot see Homer for the shields, and spears, and copper, and iron, and tombs, and funeral rites, and purification processess. Let Mr. Lang write us a book on the art of Homer; we care not for the archaeology."

"We care not for the archaeology." Of course you don't. But I want to get the archaeology right; and what my book has to do with "the monster of archaeology," except when I say that Homer does not deal in them, I do not know. Certainly, I do not appeal to "the popular judgment," nor to the University of Oxford and the Society of Jesus, as represented by Dr. Grundy and Father Donnelly, though both are most benevolent towards me as a rhymer.

A. Lang.

ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE IN MODERN TIMES.

The subject of the preceding lecture was the influence of Aristotle on Medieval Christianity. That influence, we saw, was very great, and, on the whole, beneficial. But it was not so great as to be any time unopposed, nor was it so beneficial as to exclude all other influences or render them useless. There was always, we saw, the great, though somewhat hidden, force of mysticism, which could not harmonize with Aristotelianism. At times, that force was very strong, and, while it did not affect the attitude of the official Church, or of the great centers of learning, it often lay nearer to the hearts of the people than any other force. Mysticism was often taken up as a study and a pursuit by the village pastor, or the wandering friar, or the cathedral canon who taught in the chantry school. A word of depreciation or condemnation spoken casually, would sink into the minds of the uneducated, and thus, I think, there originated the body of later medieval legends in which Aristotle figures in a way that does him little credit. Moreover, there were the alchemists and dabblers in the mysterious arts of magic, who were looked on with suspicion by the simpleminded and pious, and who were known to delve in the works of Aristotle as well as in many curious treatises falsely attributed to him. In this way, Aristotle took his place by the side of Virgil in popular legend. With this difference, that, while Virgil was a kind of white magician, a seer and a prophet who somehow favored the cause of Christianity, and never did anyone any harm, Aristotle was represented as a dark magician, dangerous, forbidding, and inclined to be malevolent. Many a harmless searcher for the philosopher's stone, which was believed to have the power to change lesser metals into gold, was supposed to have dealings with the half-Greek, half-Saracen spirit of Aristotle. And many an untoward event, many a weird happening,

many diseases and mishaps, were traced to a wizard's spell cast in the name of the Stagyrite. The wildest imaginings were indulged in, as to his personality and history. A story very commonly believed in medieval times was to the effect that his real name was Nectanebus, that he was an Egyptian necromancer, and that Alexander the Great was his son.

These were, as you may well believe, nothing but popular superstitions. They had no influence with the official Church or with the world of learned men. Still, they persisted throughout the later Middle Ages, and they had by no menas disappeared when a series of events took place in the learned world which shook the influence and prestige of Aristotle to its foundations. I refer to Humanism and the inauguration of the scientific era.

Humanism dates from the first decades of the fifteenth century. The event, however, which gave the greatest impetus to the humanistic movement was the taking of Constantinople by the Turks in 1452. Just as the capture of the same city by the Crusaders in 1204 had among its results the introduction of the Greek Aristotle into Western Europe, so now the advent of the Turk and the dispersion of the Greek scholars who lived in the city on the Bosphorus resulted in a wider knowledge of the Greek Classics throughout the Latin world. The humanistic movement was essentially a literary movement, although it, naturally, had its effect on art, philosophy and life in general. It consisted in an attempt to restore the style of the classics, but, being of its nature nothing short of fanatical, it was not content until it restored pagan customs, pagan modes of thought, and pagan standards of living. The humanists, one and all, professed nothing but comtempt for the Middle Ages, which, they contended, had cultivated the divine to the exclusion of the human in literature and in life. They themselves were the advocates of the human element—Humanists. That, having adopted a merely human standard of life, they soon fell short even of that standard is a matter with which we are not concerned here and now. We are interested rather in the attitude of the humanists towards

Aristotelianism. That attitude, we may say at once, was one of hostility. In the first place, the Greek scholars who, like the great Bessarion and Gemistus Pletho, came to Italy to attend the council of Florence, were convinced Platonists and helped to found at Florence an Academy of Platonic philosophy. Others—for the most part, Italian followers of these two—identified Aristotelianism with scholasticism, which they ridiculed and villified in every conceivable manner. The most violent of these anti-Aristotelians were Vives, Lorenzo Valla, Ficino, the two Mirandolas, and Erasmus. "Whence," asks Vives, "comes all the incredible laziness and mental slovenliness of the men of our day? It comes from this that, rather than investigate and find out for themselves, they prefer to see with another man's eyes and believe on the authority of another," namely Aristotle. The schoolmen are "like sheep led to the shambles, an ignoble herd unworthy of the name of learned, and a lasting disgrace to philosophy." You will find, if you care to read them, that these Humanists can use strong language. They are masters of the art of bitter invective. Their wit is clever, and cruel. They can shoot straight, and every arrow is poisoned. But, you will look in vain in their writings for any attempt to discuss in a serious way the merits of the scholastic Aristotelianism. As Cervantes is sometimes said to have laughed chivalry out of Spain, so the humanists tried by ridicule and abuse to drive Aristotle from the world of Western Christendom.

The fifteenth century witnessed another important event, the advent of scientific discovery. It is the century of Copernicus, Kepler, Tycho Brahe and Galileo, and was followed by the century of Boyle and Sir Isaac Newton. With these names, as you know, are associated the most important discoveries in the history of the natural sciences. Copernicus taught that the sun, not the earth, is the center of our stellar universe; Tycho Brahe furnished accurate observations to confirm the Copernican theory. Kepler discovered the laws of planetary motion and described the orbits of the planets, Galileo taught the twofold motion of the earth, and Boyle and

Newton established the fundamental laws of physics. It is now too late to do anything but deplore what we cannot in the least remedy or improve. There was no necessary conflict between these discoveries and the fundamental principles of Aristotelianism. In astronomy, especially, Aristotle merely recorded the opinions prevalent in his day, and the greatest of the schoolmen spoke with almost prophetic vision of the advent of new theories that would upset the theories generally accepted in their time. Had these men lived in the fifteenth century, they would most certainly have given credit to the discoverers and perhaps welcomed the discoveries. What their successors did is a matter of history. Unworthy of the great scientific spirit to which they were heirs, they refused to consider the discoveries of science as even probable. They fell back on Aristotle, and abused the scientists. The discoverers, or most of them, being only human, retaliated in kind, and thus an unnecessary and historically an unjustifiable, barrier was built between the philosophy of Aristotle and modern science, a barrier which all the irenic efforts of subsequent centuries have not entirely torn down. This, I say, is a matter for useless regret. The fact remains, that the scientists opposed Aristotle, because the Aristotelians would have nothing to do with the new science. Francis Bacon, who, though himself no discoverer, is looked upon as the philosopher of the age of discovery, is the spokesman of the scientists. He sounds the first note of the modern call to break away from Aristotelian tradition. The doctrine of the Schools, he says, is false and contains in itself the germs of decay. And the reason is that most of the schoolmen, with all the leisure at their disposal, and with all the acuteness of mind which they undoubtedly possess, do not give themselves to study as they ought. Their minds are shut up within the works of a few authors, especially of Aristotle, their dictator, just as their bodies are shut up in their cells. Perhaps this criticism was not altogether undeserved. There may have been in Bacon's time representatives of Aristotelianism who merited this reproach. But that was no reason why Bacon should spurn

the whole system of Aristotle and judge it unjustly. He did judge it unjustly when he pronounced it unscientific. And it was nothing but colossal vanity on his part to imagine that in the new method which he himself proposed he had superseded Aristotle. There are some, you know, who think that Bacon wrote Shakespeare's works. Of them a hostile critic has said that "he is a fool who agrees with them, and a greater fool who argues with them." Fortunately, we are called on here, neither to agree with them nor to argue with them. But, if Shakespeare the actor has, indeed, been parading in Bacon's borrowed plumes, then Bacon himself is the victim of a still more ridiculous self-imposed imposture. For he poses as the the second Aristotle. The very title of his great work *Novum Organum* asserts this claim. As Aristotle had been the master of method during the Middle Ages, Bacon, so Bacon himself claims, is the master of the only method which suits the spirit of modern science. Nothing could be more preposterous. Aristotle was the founder of the inductive method, the method of investigation of facts, the method of observation, the scientific method, as it is called. Friar Roger Bacon was the medieval representative of that method; to him Francis Bacon owes more than he acknowledges, so that, without being in the least unjust, we may say that Francis Bacon's method of scientific investigation was neither new nor original. For centuries it has been the fashion, especially in England, to ascribe to Francis Bacon and the use of his method the credit for all the discoveries that have been made in science since his time. But recently a saner view has prevailed, and modern historians see behind the Bacon who wrote the *Novum Organum* the shadow of his countryman and namesake Roger Bacon the Franciscan, and behind him the gigantic figure of Aristotle who inspired the medieval friar.

Still lingering in the fifteenth century, the period of transition from the medieval to the modern view of Aristotle, we cannot fail to notice besides humanism and the scientific movement a third very important factor in the change from medieval to modern. I refer to the Protestant Reformation.

And here one may ask at once: What has religion to do with Aristotelianism? One may repeat Tertullian's question: What has Aristotle in common with the Church? If you look closely, you will see that here, as elsewhere, changes in one department of human life effect changes in many other departments. Luther, when he broke with the past, in matters ecclesiastical, did not stop at questions of theology, liturgy and Church discipline. To his mind, Aristotle was indissolubly bound up with the Catholic system; Aristotle was associated with certain methods in theology which did not meet Luther's approval and, strangely enough, with the sacramental system of the Church which pleased him still less. Hence the bitterness I might say, the virulence of his denunciation of Aristotle. He calls him a triple-headed Cerberus, an unhappy juggler of words, a public and professed enemy of all truth. Wherever the influence of Luther was felt, Aristotelianism was vilified and misrepresented. It is true, Melanchthon took a different view. Less violent by nature and more scholarly of habit than Luther, he wished to retain something of the truth which he found in the Aristotelian philosophy, and in theory, at least, confined his opposition to what he considered to be ecclesiastical accretions to the doctrine of the Stagyrite. Academic distinctions count for little in such a contest as was then waged. Luther's sweeping condemnation of Aristotle and all his works bore down the mild protests of Melanchthon, and the Protestant movement may be counted among the forces which swept Aristotle down from the pedestal on which the medieval world had placed him.

Meanwhile another kind of Aristotelianism had sprung up, which was little more than a revival of the Averroism of the thirteenth century. As a school of interpretation it rejected most emphatically the Christian understanding of Aristotle, and went back either to the Arabians or to the oldest Greek commentators. I will mention here but a few of the names of these men, Achillini, Nifo, and Pietro Pomponazzi. They were, no doubt, important men in their day. Pomponazzi, especially, made a great stir, although, to us, his pompous pedan-

try and his monstrous pretensions to extraordinary erudition seem nothing short of ludicrous. He wrote a work on the immortality of the soul, in which, influenced by the old Neo-platonist commentators, he held Aristotle to have taught that the human soul progresses from one form of existence to another, that, according to our conduct here below, we shall advance to be lesser and then greater angels, hereafter, or, contrariwise shall descend to a lower form of demoniac existence, and that, since this progress has no limit, the soul is immortal. Of all the interpretations of Aristotle, this, I think, is the most extraordinary. The contemporaries of Pomponazzi were content to restore Averroism, more or less unmixed. The controversy raged chiefly around the question of immortality, and the Averroist solution was that, so far as philosophy goes, the individual soul cannot be immortal. But these men all claimed to be believing Christians. They styled themselves faithful children of the Catholic Church, and some of them had powerful patrons in the vicinity of the papal throne. They had, therefore,the audacity to advocate the twofold standard of truth. In philosophy, they said, the doctrine of immortality is false: in theology, it is true, so that, like Averroes himself, they proposed to believe as a matter of faith what their reason told them to to be false. This, I need hardly tell you, was in direct contradiction to the very foundation of medieval Aristotelianism. The schoolmen maintained, as the justification of all their intellectual activity, that there cannot be a contradiction between reason and revelation, and that no Christian should be asked to believe, because no human being can believe, what he knows to be false or what his reason tells him to be false.

You see for yourselves that the period of transition from the medieval to the modern estimate of Aristotle was one of immense activity in the intellectual order. The literary movement, the scientific movement, the religious upheaval, the new interpretation of Aristotle, all these were active, living forces. There is one more that must be added, the so-called Italian philosophy of Nature, represented chiefly by Giordano Bruno. It had its immediate inspiration in the scientific discoveries.

The new view of the universe as a vast system centered in the sun, appealed to the imagination. It opened up new vistas. It tended to exalt matter and material forces. The exaggeration of this sentiment in the fervid, restless disposition of a man like Bruno resulted in a deification of Nature, and the pantheistic doctrine that God and Nature are one. This, also reacted against the traditional Aristotelianism. The Aristotle that came first from the Arabian world appeared to be pantheistically inclined. But the Christian Aristotelians showed conclusively that there is no pantheism in Aristotle: on the contrary, they saw that Aristotle places God too far, so to speak, from Nature and from us. Therefore, the new naturalistic pantheism made war on Aristotle as interpreted in the schools, and joined the forces of humanism, scientific reform, religious reform and so forth, in their opposition to the Aristotle of tradition.

All these elements were, as I said, active forces. During the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries they were in a state of solution. They reached no definite form or system. The world of those days was like a seething caldron in which many substances were being melted down, like a fermentation vat in which froth and clearest essence and useless waste were boiling up in one ever restless mass. There were many philosophical tendencies, but, as yet, no system of philosophy. Of all the great countries in Europe, France was the last to be affected by these changes in the realm of thought. And, yet, France was the first to see a definite system simmer down from the formless mixture. Descartes is the first clear thinker in the modern era, and his attitude towards Aristotle has been, on the whole, that which every great philosopher since his time has adopted.

There is something that appeals to the imagination in the beginnings of Cartesianism as described by Descartes himself. In the winter of 1619-1620, he was, he tells us, in winter quarters at Neuburg on the banks of the Danube. His occupation as a soldier being suspended for several months, he spent that time in learned leisure, shut up day and night

in a room comfortably heated. While his companions in arms were occupied with such amusements as they could contrive, he devoted himself to meditation: "Undisturbed," he says, "by any cares or passions, I remained the whole day in seclusion, with full opportunity to occupy my attention with my own thoughts. Of these, one of the very first that occurred to me was, that there is seldom so much perfection in works composed of many separate parts, upon which different hands have been employed, as in those completed by a single master. Thus, it is observable that the buildings which a single architect has planned and executed are generally more elegant and commodious than those which several have attempted to improve, by making old walls serve for purposes for which they were not originally built." Fully persuaded, then, that he was acting for the best, Descartes resolved to "sweep away" all that his predecessors taught in philosophy. He determined to tear down all the structures which antiquity had reared, clear the foundation of all the debris, and build a new edifice, of which he should be the sole architect. In this universal demolition he made no exception in favor of any one philosopher. Aristotle was to go down with the rest. What his feelings were in regard to Aristotle we do not know. It is possible he may have looked on the peripatetic philosophy as the most imposing, the most carefully planned, the most solidly built. It made no difference. Down it should go with the rest, and make room for the new building, the foundation of which was Descartes' own thought, implying his own existence. "I think, therefore, I exist," is the rock on which the first course of masonry in this new edifice is laid. It matters little, for our present purpose, what we think of Descartes' foundation, or of the building which rests on it. It matters much that his work of demolition was complete and effective, so far as all modern philosophy was influenced by him. He broke definitely with tradition, and though others have built on him, none have cared to restore what he tore down and build on that. We can only deplore the imprudence of the man; we can only condemn the folly of his wholesale destruc-

tion. We may compare him to the person who burned down his house to destroy the one rat in the wainscotting. We may point out that, while esthetically and economically his comparison may hold good, pedagogically and historically, he is entirely wrong. It may be that when several builders have "tinkered," as we say, with an edifice, it would be piling monstrosity on monstrosity to add another story or another wing; it may be cheaper in the end to demolish the whole building and put up a new one. But that figure does not apply to systems of thought. The past is part of our inheritance: we have a right to what is true in it. A large part of education consists in putting the immature mind in possession of its social inheritance, and history has proved that it is impossible for any thinker, even for Descartes himself, to break entirely with the past. Descartes did wrong: that is our verdict, now that we see the consequences of his folly. There was nothing of the vandal in him: he was the gentlest of men, gentle to the point of timidity. Yet, vandalism is the only word which we can apply to the act of one who tears down without discrimination what former centuries have built, whether the building be of brick and stone or the stuff of which intellectual systems are constructed.

Descartes, to change the figure of speech, snapped the thread of tradition, so far as Aristotle was concerned, and no great philosopher of modern times has tried to tie the broken ends together. The eighteenth century ignored Aristotle: its greatest thinkers hardly mentioned him. Leibniz alone appreciated him. He was as anxious to conciliate as Descartes had been to obliterate. He was by profession a diplomat as well as a scholar: his aim was to conciliate all parties and reconcile all schools. It was his influence, combined with the general constructive tendency of nineteenth century thought, that revived interest in Aristotle during the last hundred years. That interest, however, was largely historical and critical. So far as building on the foundation of Aristotle is concerned, such a procedure was as far from the minds of the nineteenth century philosophers as it was from Descartes'. Instead, philo-

sophers built on the Cartesian foundation of subjectivism and introspection. Over all the philosophical efforts of the nineteenth century is the trail of the so-called first principle "I think, therefore I exist." Some, indeed, like Kant, substitute the practical for the theoretical reason, without, however, changing the essential nature of the method or the character of the results. Aristotle built his philosophy on the broad basis of science. In his ground plan there was room for both observation and introspection, and every stone of the edifice was fitted into its place and cemented into the structure by a logic which is valid in nature as well as in human nature. Nineteenth century philosophy was content to follow Descartes and construct on the basis of introspection, whether psychological or ethical, using as a principle of cohesion the logic of theoretical consciousness or of moral conscience, but neglecting always the logic of the sciences, the reasonableness of nature, the principles of common sense. It turned the pyramid upside down, attempting the impossible feat of balancing it on its apex. Not human nature, but nature, is the foundation of philosophy, and the folly of neglecting this principle has resulted, as we now see, in creating a conflict between philosophy and natural science. Philosophy should have known better. Even on general principles, it should have recognized that a complete break of continuity can result in nothing but disaster. It is out of the Middle Ages that the modern world grew, and, like Anteus of old, who gathered strength from contact with mother-earth, the world of thought at any period has much to gain and nothing to lose by keeping in touch with the foregoing generation of thinkers, whose work makes progress possible.

It is one of the singular inconsistencies of historical development that, although Aristotle was greatest as a philosopher, his influence in philosophy practically ended with Descartes, while in other departments of knowledge, his influence continued to be real and efficient. The science of the nineteenth century and of our own day, I need not tell you, is very different from Aristotle's. We now know many things

about nature which he did not know. Were he to come back to earth, a highschool pupil could teach him many things that would astonish him in physics and physiology and the elements of medical theory—and he would, I think, be willing to learn. But, while our acquired knowledge is so much vaster than his, and corrects his views on many points, the general outlook of science on nature is not very different from his, and the greatest scientists are the first to acknowledge that he it was who blazed out the paths which they follow. In literary criticism, too, his influence has not died out. The great struggle between classicism and romanticism in the early decades of the nineteenth century resulted in a compromise. Classicism yielded, without being obliged completely to abdicate its claims. And Aristotle is a representative of the classic spirit. Modern literature is wiser, if I may say so, than modern philosophy. It knows how to preserve what is best in the heritage of the past. It has combined romanticism with classicism. It has not neglected the contributions that came from the Teutonic spirit, its sombre, grandiose, and mystic imaginings, its love of the weird, the supernatural, the grotesque. Neither has modern literature spurned the rich legacy of the Celtic civilization, the Celtic spirit of gayety and piety, its love of the whimsical, the ludicrous, the humorous, the pathetic and the spiritually pure. With these elements, however, modern literature and modern art have retained the classic love of the tangible, the clearcut, the definitely human, and the healthy classic sense of naturalness. Our outlook on life—which is the material of literature and art—is wider and more sympathetic than Aristotle's. Christianity as a social force has contributed a good deal to that result. At the same time, we have not, I repeat, discarded the classic element and, in judging that element, in estimating its value, in testing literature according to it as a standard, we still follow the principles of literary criticism as formulated by Aristotle. Even when Aristotle's reputation as a philosopher was at its lowest, his rank among the literary critics was acknowledged by literary men. Voltaire, I need hardly tell you, had little

sympathy with Aristotle's philosophy. Yet, it was Voltaire who exclaimed "What a wonderful man Aristotle was! He traces the rules of tragedy with the same hand which penned the rules of dialectic, the principles of Ethics and the laws of political science, with the hand which lifted, in the measure in which it is possible for human nature to do so, the veil that hides the mysteries of nature. Who can refuse to admire him when one sees how profoundly he knew the principles of eloquence and of poetry? Where is there today a physician who could teach us how to compose a discourse or write a tragedy? He, like Plato, saw that true philosophy is the secret guide of the mind in all the arts. The laws that he lays down are still the laws which are followed by our best authors."

The general discredit of Aristotle as a philosopher was not, however, admitted in the official schools of the Catholic Church. During the period of the Reformation and afterwards, the teachers in Catholic universities, colleges and seminaries saw no reason to change their estimate of Aristotle's philosophy. Not only his logic, but his metaphysics, his ethics, his psychology and his philosophy of nature continued to be taught in the great centers of learning in Spain, France and Italy, wherever the influence of the Catholic Church was dominant. In those institutions, elaborate commentaries were written on his philosophical works, and his doctrines were defended against the humanists, the new scientists and the philosophers of the modern era. The wit of the humanists made no impression on these Aristotelians. The discoveries of the scientists, when they were appreciated at all, were appreciated as contributions to science which did not alter Aristotle's general outlook on nature. The plea of Descartes for a wholesale demolition of the past in philosophy was estimated at its true value. It was judged to be unwise in principle and unwarranted in point of fact, so far as Aristotle was concerned. There may have been obstinacy in the unwillingness of some of the Aristotelians to consider the just claims of the new thought. But there was, I think, justice and enlightenment in the estimate which they placed on Cartesianism when they pronounced it

false in its initial assumption, wrong in its course of development, and disastrous in the conclusions to which it leads. The pantheism of Spinoza, the immaterialism of Berkeley, the skepticism of Hume, Kant's destructive criticism of theoretical thought, the rationalistic gnosticism of Hegel, the Agnosticism of the English School and the violation of common sense by the Absolutist School,—all these the Aristotelians consider to be the luckless legacy of Cartesianism to modern thought. Philosophical criticism takes no account of good intentions. We know that the purpose of Spinoza was admirable. We sympathise with the effort of Berkeley to construct along the lines of Platonic spiritualism. We realize that Kant was deeply concerned for the great ethical and religious truths. We acknowledge the honesty of the Agnostic and the earnestness of the Absolutist. We can even admire the purpose of the pragmatist who has the courage of his convictions. Logic takes none of these palliating circumstances into account. The logic of the Aristotelian leads him to the conclusion that these men did wrong when they built on the false foundation of Cartesianism, and he cannot but deplore that they did so.

What, then, one may ask, do the Aristotelians expect of the student of philosophy today? Do they ask him to ignore the whole progress of modern thought? By no means. There is much to be learned from the great thinkers whose errors I have just now enumerated. What the Aristotelian contends is that the starting-point of modern thought is wrong, that we should not be content with going back to Kant or to Berkeley or to Descartes, but should go back to Aristotle, whose starting point is observation of the whole field of nature, and whose guiding principle in philosophy as well as in science is organized, reflective common sense. But, the modern student protests, are not the Aristotelians asking too much? We live in the twentieth century, in an age of enlightenment and universal education. We have come into a rich inheritance of achievement and progress. We know infinitely more than Aristotle did. We have conquered, or almost conquered, the forces of nature, and in all that pertains to civilization and culture, in our spiritual

life, above all, we have advanced far beyond anything that he ever dreamt of. He was a pagan in an age long gone, an age inferior to ours in all that makes life worth living. Is it not preposterous, then, to ask us to go back to Aristotle in philosophy?

And yet, the request is not so preposterous as it seems. We go back very willingly to Homer to learn the art of poetry, and no modern writer of an epic would resent comparison with the blind bard whose theme was Achilles' wrath and the wanderings of Odysseus. We go back to Aeschylus and Euripides as models of dramatic composition, and I am sure no dramatist of today would consider that he had failed had he succeeded as they did in putting on the stage a great episode of human life or a portrayal of human character. No singer of today would scorn comparison with Sappho or with Pindar. And in the plastic arts are the Greeks not still our masters? To emulate the success of Phidias and Praxiteles in the sphere in which each excelled is no mean ambition in a modern sculptor or painter. I do not mean to say that there is no inspiration elsewhere for poet or artist. What I mean is that the achievements of the Greek mind in some of its departments of activity are still a standard, an inspiration and, indeed, the despair of the modern mind in the same departments. But, you will say, perhaps, you are forgetting that philosophy is a science, not an art. No one would think of going back to the childish notion of Thales that the earth is a solid disk floating on an immense body of water, that the stars are the boats in which the heavenly gods float around on a sea above us, each twinkling light being the lantern at the prow of some celestial barque. No one would be so absurd as to ask us to believe with Aristotle that fire mounts upward because it is a light substance and its home is in the heavens, while a stone falls towards the earth because in it the earthly element predominates and its home is underneath our feet. The science of the Greeks is, indeed, antiquated, and philosophy is a science. But, I answer, philosophy is not a science like other sciences. It is a science *sui generis*. More than any other science, it

depends on a few fundamental truths, on a right beginning and a sound concept of method. Therefore, it is more independent than the other sciences in regard to the *Zeitgeist,* the spirit of the times. In this it is like the arts. For, artistic productions of the highest excellence are preserved perennially supreme in their own order according to the acknowledged principle that "a thing of beauty is a joy forever." The quality which makes the artist supreme is elusive. You can hardly define it. Certainly you cannot reduce it to definite principles of composition or execution. You cannot parcel it out and distribute it to pupils in the studio or the classroom. It belongs to the region of genius. Similarly, the philosopher is not the man who knows most, but the man whose outlook on the world of knowledge is sane and true. That, I contend, is a quality which time and its vicissitudes do not affect. It is a quality which knowledge does not affect; for the philosopher dominates the world of knowledge, is not dominated by it. Plato was right when he called philosophy "the divinest music." For it is an art; it may become a lost art, and if it is once lost, it is not knowledge that will restore it, whatever else will do so. There is then, no chronological line drawn across human history that would warrant us in saying: *Before* this time Aristotle was a safe guide; *after* it he is not. If Aristotle is right in his starting-point, and has the correct conception of the method of philosophy, then, no matter what progress science has made, no matter what advancement humanity has made in every direction, he is still a safe guide in philosophy, and will be, for all time. Science may modify his conclusions—our conclusions—progress may affect the results that we reach by means of his method; but no changes need affect the principles with which we start or the method that we follow, if these are fundamentally right.

I have said that there is no chronological line separating the age that should find Aristotle adequate in philosophy from the age in which his inadequacy would become apparent. There is, however, a line which separates, and always will separate, those whom Aristotle satisfies from those who find him

unsatisfying. The line to which I refer is not historical but psychological, not determined by the succession of events but by the varieties of temperament. It was a favorite saying of Schlegel that we are all born either Aristotelians or Platonists. To some, the scientist appeals; to others the poet and metaphysician. Some love the light that Aristotle brings; others prefer the warmth of Plato's presence and the fire of his inspiration. For some, the supreme quality in the philosopher is clearsightedness; for others it is fervor. One man demands a calm, cold presentation of facts: he will prefer Aristotle. Another looks for spiritual thoughts that will lift him to a higher plane and wean him away from the sordid material world: he will prefer Plato. Recently some learned English writer whimsically proposed a practical test of this temperamental difference. The Aristotelians, he said, are lovers of dogs and Platonists are fonder of cats. There is, indeed, in the restless inquisitiveness of the dog, in his persistent pursuit of something or another, an emblem, albeit an inadequate one, of the spirit of Aristotelianism. And is not the fireside sphinx, sitting still for hours and blinking blissfully in the warmth, a picture of the contemplative life, and a not inapt image of Platonism? However this may be, there is truth in the underlying principle. We may be indifferent both to cats and to dogs, or we may admire both. But, if we are philosophers, we shall find that we naturally incline either towards Platonism or towards Aristotelianism. Each system attains the ultimate goal in its own way; and there they meet. For no matter how much difference of method there may be at the beginning and during the quest, since one sets out to find the Beautiful and the other to attain the True, if the one ends by realizing that God is the Supreme Beauty and the other reaches at last the conviction that God is Supreme Truth, their paths have at last converged, and the conclusion of Christian Platonism is identical with that of Christian Aristotelianism. Nevertheless, it remains, that, for some, salvation, in the intellectual sense, is through Aristotle and not through Plato. What a pity, then, that modern thought has been so misguided as to

break with the historic past, so far as Aristotle is concerned. Many a student is barred from the sympathetic study of Aristotle because the whole world in which he lives has put so low an estimate on Aristotle's philosophy, while for this particular searcher for the truth perhaps Aristotle is the one leader whose guidance would be salutary.

But, as I said at the beginning of this course, we cannot stem the tide of modern progress even if we would, and no system of philosophy has been benefitted by indulging in useless regrets or quarrelling with the course which history has taken. I believe, as I said then, that common sense will once more have a hearing in philosophy and, when that day comes, Aristotelianism will not be ignored.

And now, instead of trying to sum up the achievements of Aristotle in the various departments of human endeavor, let me make a somewhat appaling supposition. Let us imagine that the world, our world, was visited by some overwhelming catastrophe, destructive not only of our material achievements, but also of all that has been accomplished in the intellectual order. Let us imagine that all our public monuments, our newspapers, magazines and books were destroyed. Let us suppose that the work of devastation was carried farther than ever before, that the destroyer was more ruthless than the Vandal or the Goth, more destructive than the Dane, more truculently opposed to all literature than the Hun or the Ostrogoth. If, now, you were asked to select the writings of one man, which were to be excepted from the general catastrophe, and handed down to a new generation, to the race of conquerors, by which they were to judge the past, what writer would you select? You would not select your favorite poet; for his works would tell the newcomers nothing about history or science or philosophy. You would not select the historian, for a similar reason, nor the scientist nor the philosopher. You would, in that imaginary case, look around for a work more comprehensive than the works of any of these. You would, perhaps, think of some vast encyclopedia, the new *Britannica,* for instance, and, you would say: Let that survive; that tells more about our present civili-

zation than any other work. There is something in it about our literature, our science, our philosophy, our institutions, our history, and if there is only one work to survive and tell the conquerors about us, let that be the work. But, your encyclopedia is a product of many minds, of hundreds, at least, each of whom is an expert in his own line. The ancient world in a similar crisis, could have selected the works of one man, and that man was Aristotle. Too much of the literature of the past has been lost to us, and no one would be so lacking in appreciation as to wish more of it had been lost. But, *if* more of it had perished, what one collection would we, would the Greeks themselves, have wished to save? I think there can be no hesitation about the answer. Aristotle's works are the most comprehensive and complete record of what the Greek mind achieved in every department. He did not write poetry like Homer's nor prose like Plato's. But, more completely than these or any others of his countrymen he left in his collection of writings a record of Greek achievement and a critical study of the spirit of Greek civilization. This is, perhaps, the secret of his extraordinary influence. His mind, somehow, recapitulated all the past of his country and his race, and this is why, since the links between the present and the past are few, his spirit it is, more than any other, that binds the years and even the centuries together. His genius, in that sense, is secular. In no age and in no country will his voice be entirely unheard, and as long as men know how to appreciate overtowering genius, Aristotle will not be without some, at least, to admire his greatness. The world of thought may never again be obliged to rely on him alone, as it did for several centuries, but it will never be able to ignore what he has done, and, let us hope, it will never again try to forget what it owes him.

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THE MATERIALISTIC INTERPRETATION OF EARLY CHRISTIAN HISTORY

The Materialistic Interpretation of History is the name given to a theory or philosophy of history according to which all the facts and stages in the social progress of mankind and all existing or extinct social institutions are declared to be products of economic causes. The credit for having originated this theory belongs to Karl Marx, the founder of scientific socialism. Long before the time of Marx, however, scientists and philosophers had been seeking for some category under which the phenomena of history might be placed or some principle round which they might be grouped. The traditional transcendental or religious view of history which had prevailed in Europe since the time of St. Augustine, was not seriously questioned until the seventeenth century, when many writers, especially Vico (1668-1744), the Founder of Modern Italian Philosophy, and Montesquieu (1689-1755) insisted on the predominant influence of the external world on the progress of human affairs. The first who worked this theory out philosophically was Buckle, who, in the second chapter of his *History of Civilization*, referred all progress to the influence of physical laws and geographical environment, asserting, however, with some reservations, that history is to be interpreted through the effects of climate, food, and soil upon social environment.[1]

In the meantime a different tendency was observable in Germany, when under the influence of Lessing, Herder and Kant an idealistic method of interpretation was introduced which reached its culmination in Hegel, by whom History was defined as the Process of Reason as Spirit.[2] Both

[1] See Seligman, *The Economic Interpretation of History*, 2nd Ed. Chaps. II and III on the subject of the Philosophical Antecedents of the Theory and its Genesis and Development.

[2] Turner, *History of Philosophy*, p. 579.

these currents may be said to have united in Karl Marx. Marx was born at Trier in 1818 and after finishing his course at the University of Bonn was on the point of devoting himself to an academic career by seeking admission to the University as a *Privat-Docent,* when a change in the political horizon in Germany induced him to take up journalism. His journalistic work commenced as a member of the staff of the *Rheinische Zeitung,* a paper founded in Cologne by the young Hegelian or Philosophical Radical Party. His writings exhibited such vigor and boldness that he was appointed editor in 1842. He held this position for a little over a year, when the paper, because of its radical tone, was suppressed by order of the Prussian Ministry. From Cologne, Marx went to Paris, when after an unsuccessful effort to continue his journalistic labors as collaborator on another paper the *Deutsche-französische Jahrbücher,* which ceased publication after one or two numbers, and on *Vorwärts* and other radical organs, he turned his attention to the Young-Hegelians and in conjunction with Frederick Engels a former newspaper colleague in Cologne he wrote a pamphlet entitled *Die heilige Familie* directed especially against Bruno Bauer, "who had offended him as Jew, as Radical and as journalist." In this work which appeared in 1845 and which was written almost exclusively by Marx, are to be found, according to Professor Seligman, the first incidental allusions to the doctrine of materialistic interpretation. It was not until two years later that he was sufficiently convinced of the force of his theory to explain it more in detail and to use it as a means to combat the older socialists. In his *Misère de la philosophie,* written in reply to Proudhon's *Philosophe de la misère,* Marx boldly advanced the theory that history must be interpreted under the aspect of an economic development, and that social relations are based on the variations of productive forces.

"In changing the mode of production," he says, "mankind changes all its social relations. The hand-mill creates a society with the feudal lord; the steam mill a society with the industrial capitalist. The same men who establish social re-

lations in conformity with their material production also create principles, ideas and categories in conformity with their social relations . . . all such ideas and categories are therefore historical and transitory products." [3]

Having seized this view of history, Marx lost no time in giving it circulation. In the Manifesto of the Communist Party, which he and Engels prepared, and which was adopted by the General Congress of the Communist League in London in 1847, and published the following year, we find a direct application of the principle to industrial problems. As explained by Engels, "the Manifesto assumed as its fundamental proposition: that in every historical epoch the prevailing mode of economic production and exchange, and the social organization necessarily following from it, form the basis upon which is built up, and from which alone can be explained, the political and intellectual history of that epoch, that, consequently, the whole history of mankind (since the dissolution of primitive tribal society holding land in common ownership) has been a history of class struggles, contests between exploiting and exploited, ruling and oppressed classes: that the history of these class struggles forms a series of evolution in which nowadays a stage has been reached where the exploited and oppressed class—the proletariat—cannot attain its emancipation from the sway of the exploiting and ruling class—the bourgeoisie—without at the same time and once and for all, emancipating society at large from all exploitation, oppression, class-distinctions and class struggles." [4]

It is not necessary to discuss the further elaboration and development of the theory, by which, under the stress of adverse criticism, Marx and Engels sought to meet the arguments and objections of their adversaries. They made some concessions; but the theory in principle remained unchanged. Engels, in letters written towards the close of his life, admitted that "the actual form of social organization is often deter-

[3] Quoted by Professor Seligman, p. 35.
[4] *Introduction to Manifesto,* Eng. Tran., p. 7.

mined by political, legal, philosophical and religious theories and conceptions." [5] but as he was positive in asserting that all these forces find their basis in economic need, the admission induced no essential modification in the original claim.

It is impossible to find any subsequent defence or application of the theory which may be considered authoritative. What Marx understood by economic cause with relation to social life and history is clearly expressed in one of his letters. "We understand by the economic relations, which we regard as the determining basis of the history of society, the methods by which the members of a given society produce their means of support and exchange the products among each other, so far as the division of labor exists. The whole technique of production and of transportation is thus included. Furthermore this technique, according to our view, determines the methods of exchange, the distribution of products, and hence after the dissolution of gentile society, the division of society into classes, the relations of personal control and subjection, and thus the existence of the state of politics, of law, etc. . . . Although technique is mainly dependent on the condition of science, it is still more true that science depends on the conditions and need of technique. A technical want felt by society is more of an impetus to science than ten universities." [6]

Understanding, then, by the economic factors, all the forces that are directly or indirectly connected with man's effort to sustain life, and, assuming that the "history of mankind is the history of mankind in society," we may accept as a succinct, though conservative statement of what the economic interpretation of History means, that of Professor Seligman: "The existence of man," he says, "depends upon his ability to sustain himself: the economic life is therefore the fundamental condition of all life. Since human life, however, is the life of man in society, individual existence moves within the framework of the social structure and is modified by it. What the conditions of maintenance are to the individual,

[5] Seligman, *loc. cit.*, p. 63.
[6] Quoted by Seligman, p. 59.

the similar relations of production and consumption are to the community. To economic causes, therefore, must be traced in last instance those transformations in the structure of society which themselves condition the relations of social classes and the various manifestations of social life." [7]

How the various factors which enter into the human struggle for existence have modified the form of society at different epochs and in different localities according to the defenders of this Philosophy of History is clear from their theory of social evolution. It is assumed, especially by the later advocates of the economic theory, who have accepted the doctrine of biological evolution, that there was a time when men lived in a condition little better than that of the brutes, with no morals, no science, with merely the rudiments of speech, and consequently with no social organization. All the means of subsistence were in common, or rather, life depended on the physical strength and skill of the individual. This condition represents the struggle for existence in the lowest form. Through experience these primitive human beings discovered that co-operation was advantageous, and from the same physical need for the means of subsistence they formed groups, held together by different ties. Society in this inchoate and rough form has no other end than the preservation and conservation of life. This character and purpose according to Marx and his followers it has never lost. "The final causes of all social changes," says Engels, "are to be sought not in men's brains, not in man's better insight into eternal truth and justice, but in changes in the modes of production and exchange. They are all to be sought, not in the philosophy, but in the economics of each particular period."

Proceeding on the hypothesis that groups were formed in the manner indicated, it is clear that they were subject to two sets of influences, to which are attributed all the changes in life and thought which make up what is called progress. One set of influences, affecting all the members of this group

[7] *The Economic Interpretation of History*, p. 3.

alike, arose from physical environment, climate, soil, food and clothing, and produced what are called racial characteristics. Thus, as Professor Patten expounds one phase of the theory, "a people who live on barley, whose fuel and timber come from pine forests, whose transportation depends on cattle, and who fight with spears, have little use for fine sensory distinctions, and still less for the analytic faculties and logical powers. . . . Men reared in such an environment have an overflow of energy and activity. Their activity usually takes the form of war and conquest, through which the motor powers are developed out of proportion to the other sides of national character." [8]

The other set of influences, operative within the group itself, arises from the struggle between man and man for the means of subsistence. To the various manifestations of this economic struggle are traced the different kinds of social institutions, which are classified as economic, aesthetic, moral and religious. "Each nation," says Professor Patten, "rose out of the peculiar conditions of its environment, developed groups of ideas in each of the four fields, and then through contact with other civilizations received ideas from them which were blended with those acquired in its own history." [9]

It is needless to say that this theory of life and history, dealing as it does with the most profound and far-reaching questions that can occupy the thoughts of men, has not gone unchallenged. Many objections have been brought against it which it will be sufficient merely to enumerate. First, it has been pointed out that the theory of Economic Interpretation rests on the logical error of confounding a *conditio sine qua non* with an efficient cause, and hence, that its defenders are guilty of asserting, that—because food, drink, clothing and shelter are necessary for men in order that he may exercise his faculties and his social capabilities, that he may think and plan, and play politics and paint and write

[8] *The Development of English Thought.* A Study in the Economic Interpretation of History, p. 6.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 46.

poetry,—the cause of all these various activities is to be found in what he eats and drinks, in his clothing and his habitation. Another objection arises from the erroneous *method* followed by the defenders of the theory, who, exaggerating the organic character of society, and forgetting that it is an organism only by analogy, attribute to it all the organic characteristics, or as Mr. Gilbert K. Chesterton has pithily expressed it, of arguing that "because man is a biped fifty men are a centipede."

A third objection is that the theory of Economic Interpretation is deterministic, that it is opposed to the doctrine of free will. A general discussion of the merits of economic determinism is not possible here. It will be sufficient to appeal to the general consciousness of freedom and responsibility to show that the character of the social organisation does not rob a man of this prerogative. Closely connected with this objection is the obvious failure in the theory of Economic Interpretation sufficiently to account for the part played by great men in history. "If anything is humanly certain it is that the great man's society, properly so called, does *not* make him before he can remake it.—Can it be that the convergence of Sociological pressures so impinged on Stratford-upon-Avon about the 26th of April, 1564, that a W. Shakespeare, with all his mental peculiarities, had to be born there—as the pressure of water outside a certain boat will cause a stream of a certain form to ooze into a particular leak? And if the aforesaid W. Shakespeare had died of cholera infantum, would another mother at Stratford-upon-Avon have engendered a duplicate copy of him, to restore the sociologic equilibrium,—just as the stream of water will reapear, no matter how often you pass a sponge over the leak, so long as the outside level remains unchanged? Or might the substitute arise at Stratford-atte-Bowe?" [10]

Many other objections have been brought against the theory, such as: that it assumes the operation of historical laws, the

[10] W. James, *The Will to Believe*, p. 235.

existence of which has not been proven; that it fails to account for progress or degeneration among nations;[11] that it entirely neglects the ethical and spiritual forces in history; and that its adoption as an actual determining factor in life would result in absurdities and confusion.

Notwithstanding these objections, however, the Theory of Economic Interpretation of History has had a tremendous influence on the historiography of the last quarter of a century. In the hands of some writers it has been a means of unravelling the complicated movements of whole epochs, or has afforded grounds to explain the existence and nature of social institutions: others have been influenced less strongly; but in discussing historical matters, they do not fail to make due allowance for the play and interplay of social and economic forces. The most important contribution to the elucidation of the working of economic forces in history was perhaps the work of Lewis H. Morgan on Ancient Society, in which tracing the evolution of Society through the different stages of the horde, the clan, the family and the state, he called attention to the economic importance of the change from the Matriarchate to the Patriarchate.[12] Other writers have pursued the same or allied themes, such as Grosse[13] developed in economic conditions. Ferrero in his "Greatness and Decline of Rome," has given a popular exposition of how this theory can be applied to a higher form of civilization, and Prutz and Kautsky have dealt with the Crusades and the Reformation as manifestations of economic antagonism. Pöhlmann[14] finds in the economic condition of Greece the basis of its

[11] Professor Patten thinks he has found the solution of this difficulty. He proposes to "use the economic interpretation of history to explain the degenerate tendencies in civilization, and then to employ social psychology to set forth the opposing forces of regeneration." *The Social Basis of Religion.* Preface, p. v.

[12] L. H. Morgan, *Ancient Society*, New York, 1877. On the importance of Morgan's work see Bernheim, *Lehrbuch der historischen Methode und der Geschichtsphilosophie.* (4th ed., p. 672).

[13] *Die Formen der Familie und Formen der Wirtschaft*, 1896.

[14] *Geschichte des antiken Kommunismus und Sozialismus.*

political constitution, and even Greek Philosophy has been explained as an outcome of social conditions.[15] Professor Patten traces to economic causes the development of English thought, and in a recent work has propounded the theory that Religion has a social basis.[16] As viewed by Professor Patten "religion is a natural movement based on social feeling, and focused by external conditions. It is an expression of a reaction against conflict, degeneration and depravity." [17] In fact not only religion, but the moral code and conscience or the ability to distinguish between good and bad have been described as historical products of social forces.

The most striking attempt, however, to carry the theory to its fullest logical conclusion was that in which it was sought to find an explanation of the origin of Christianity in economic facts alone. The first who applied the materialistic theory of history to Christianity was Engels.[18] He was followed by Kautsky, the editor of the socialistic organ, *Die Neue Zeit,* who in 1885 devoted several articles to expound the same views. The subject was subsequently dealt with by Engels and Schmidt in divers contributions to the same publication, and by Kautsky in his work, "Forerunners of the Newer Socialism." [19] The thought which all these writers strove to accentuate, namely that Christianity was primarily an economic movement arising out of social unrest, has entered into the very fibre of modern socialistic literature, though as a general rule no special pains are taken by most of the writers who make this assumption to prove its accuracy. Kautsky, who may be regarded as preëminently the historian of the socialistic party in Germany, has made a fresh presentation of the subject in a work on the origin of Christianity which appeared last year.[20] This contains what may reasonably be

[15] Eleutheropoulos, *Wirtschaft und Philosophie,* 1900.
[16] *The Social Basis of Religion,* 1911.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 101.
[18] "Bruno Bauer und das Urchristentum" in the *Züricher Sozialdemocrat.* 1882 (nos. 19, 20).
[19] *Vorläufer des neueren Sozialismus,* 2te Auflage, Stuttgart, 1909.
[20] *Der Ursprung des Christentums.* Stuttgart, 1910.

regarded as the final result of about thirty years of effort to apply to Christianity the principles of the materialistic Philosophy of History.

In the Introduction to this work Kautsky confesses that he can make no claim to be regarded as a specialist in the field of early church history, and bases his competence to speak on the subject on the fact that his life has been passed in the study of social problems. The experience he received through participating in the class struggles of the proletariat, gives him, he considers, an insight into the real character of Christianity which can never be attained by the student of Theology or the History of Religion. True to the spirit of his philosophy and the principles of his school, he assumes as the fundamental idea of his work that it is not necessary to take into account the Person or the work of Jesus Christ in order to explain the rise and spread of the Christian religion. Christianity, he asserts, was, in the beginning, nothing but a movement among the proletariat, which originated in the economic conditions of the time, and which aimed primarily and solely at social reform.

In regard to the first of these assertions it is hardly necessary to state that Kautsky derived his opinions and his arguments from Bauer and the representatives of the extinct school of Tübingen critics. To support his contention that Christ never lived, he finds it necessary to discuss the pagan writers Tacitus, Suetonius and Dion Cassius, in whose works references are found to Christianity and the Christians, and while not actually committing himself to the statement that all the passages in these authors are fabrications, he says that their genuineness is far from being established, and that even admitting that they are genuine, they contain no evidence that Jesus ever lived, for they do not speak of Him but of Christus, which after all is nothing but the Greek translation of Messias. Kautsky neglects to speak of the testimony of Pliny the Younger, whose writings ante-date those of either Tacitus or Suetonius, and lays great stress on the fact that if Jesus had ever lived these authors or the contemporary Jewish

writers would not have failed to speak of Him. The question of the authenticity of the passages in these pagan authors referred to by Kautsky, is one which has received such a thorough sifting at the hands of competent critics, that it seems disingenuous, to say the least, in view of the unanimity which prevails regarding their genuineness among those who have specially studied the matter, to reopen the discussion or to hint at their spuriousness, without advancing a shred of new evidence or without having taken the trouble to examine the old.

The argument from silence is not necessarily a reliable one in the eyes of the historian, and in the present instance it is not only not pertinent but valueless. In Josephus there can be found statements which are applicable to nothing else in contemporary Jewish history but the beginnings of Christianity, and in the case of the other authors, Jewish as well as pagan, there is no reason why they should have gone outside the scope and purpose of their works to speak of Christ or His teaching, because even if they knew Him they were not in a position to judge of the importance of His doctrines, and unconverted as they were, He was to them merely an insignificant prophet in a remote province of the vast Roman Empire.[21] In dealing with the Christian sources for the Life of Christ Kautsky adopts a Bourbon attitude of learning nothing and forgetting nothing, that could hardly be looked for in a progressive advocate of the rights of the proletariat. He asserts that he is unable to convince himself of the genuineness of the New Testament documents, that he regards them as utterly devoid of value as historical sources, that they originated as party pamphlets to convince the unthinking and

[21] An excellent presentation of the case against Kautsky and the defenders of the economic view of the origin of Christianity may be found in Herman Köhler, *Sozialistische Irrlehren von der Entstehung des Christentums und ihre Widerlegung*, Leipzig, 1899, to whom the author of the present article wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness. The subject is also dealt with by Schaub, *Die Eigentumslehre nach Thomas von Aquin und dem modernen Sozialismus*, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der beiderseitigen Weltauschauungen. Freiburg, 1898.

unsuspecting populace and that their authors escaped detection through the general credulity of the public and the universal thirst for the sensational. One of the few survivors of the radicals who drew inspiration from the works of Baur and Strauss half-a-century ago, Kautsky can find none among the more recent authors to give him comfort except Pfleiderer. He sets himself in opposition to all the present day critics of the New Testament in clinging to the old theories regarding the late origin of the New Testament writings. He admits that Mark's Gospel was written sometime shortly after the fall of Jerusalem, but describes it as the result of half-a-century of legend building. The other gospels were from a later date, that of John from the middle of the second century. All the rest of the early Christian literature he considers to be unquestionably spurious in the sense that it was written at a date much later than that claimed by the documents themselves, and by persons other than the reputed authors.

It is not easy to know how to answer such Rip-van-Winkle views as these. Had Kautsky not buried himself in the affairs of the proletariat for forty years and had he any knowledge of what was being accomplished in the meantime, he might have known that the world of Biblical research has been peopled with eager investigators, and that such men as Theodor Keim, Eduard Reuss, Carl Holstein, Carl Hase, Weizsäcker, Heinrich Holtzman, Bernhard Weiss, Adolf Hilgenfeld, Theodor Zahn, Adolf Harnack, Lightfoot, Funk, Westcott and hosts of others, orthodox and rationalistic, had devoted themselves to the solution of problems which he handles so lightly, that their conclusions are in opposition to his, that he speaks a language which has grown old in the field of New Testament study and that he defends theories which are now mentioned only to cause a smile. He might have known that even the most radical of modern critics will not set the date of Mark later than the year 70; of Matthew later than 75; of Luke's gospel and Acts, later than 90, and of John scarcely later than the end of the first century. He might further have known that in all cases the usually accepted date is much earlier.

This is not the place to enter into a disquisition regarding the chronology of the New Testament documents and of early Christian literature. The same necessity which presented itself to the authors whom Kautsky follows of denying the historicity of an entire literature in order to destroy the historic character of the gospels and the historic Person of Christ, still exists. In order to remove the gospels and the epistles from the category of genuine and trustworthy historical sources it will be necessary not only to prove the spuriousness of the few scattered passages in pagan writers, but to remove from the field the copious fund of literature which came from the pens of Christian authors in the first and second century. The writings of Clement and Papias, of Ignatius, of Polycarp, of Irenaeus, of Justin and many others must be proved to be forgeries before the reliability of the New Testament can be assailed. These are the outworks. While they stand the citadel is impregnable. If modern historical criticism has any achievement to its credit, it is that of having established upon a secure footing the character and genuineness of the writings of these early Christian authors. The problems regarding early Christian history have very largely ceased to be of a critical nature. The materials are ready for the investigator, their trustworthiness and genuineness are guaranteed by the erudition and zeal of the scholars, who won concession after concession from their opponents, until the documents, witnessing to the earliest records of Christianity, are no more assailed in critical circles.

Here, of course, it would be perfectly justifiable to take leave of Kautsky and the other upholders of the Materialistic Interpretation of History as applied to early Christianity and its Founder. If they choose to follow the methods of the old Roman tyrants who knocked the heads off the statues of their murdered predecessors and substituted graven images of themselves, relying on the terror and self-interest of the mob to see in them the unimpaired work of the original artist, they can hardly expect that the intelligence of the modern world or even the desire for social reorganization can endure such

fetters. Modern scholarship has gone on record for certain well-defined facts regarding the life and Personality of the Founder of Christianity, and the theory, whatever it may be, either of Theology or history, which attempts to gain recognition must be made to fit the facts, not the facts the theory. If the doctrine of the Materialistic Interpretation of History can be made applicable to the origin of Christianity, only by denying the historic reality of the Person of Christ and refusing to take into account His life and His works, then either the theory falls or the students and scholars of half-a-century have worked in vain.

The other phase of the question, viz., that Christianity originated as the result of economic needs and that in essence it was primarily an economic movement is much too elaborate to permit of detailed examination. At the outset, however, we are confronted by a strange and inexplicable contradiction. All the defenders of the Materialistic Philosophy are unanimous in rejecting the gospels as sources for the Life of Christ, but by a strange inconsistency the same documents are accepted without question or explanation as affording valid evidence for the early history of Christianity when it is viewed in the light of a communistic movement. In fact the most pronounced advocates of the system not only accept these documents as trustworthy when they are to be used as sources for a supposed communistic revolt, but they quote with approval as containing the very essence of communistic teaching, the words of Christ to the Rich Young Man, Matt. xix, 21, "If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell all thou hast and give to the poor."

Passing over, then, the unquestionable inconsistency of procedure by which the same documents are alternately accepted and rejected, we find that in order to explain the origin of Christianity on purely natural grounds, or to find a means by which economic need might be substituted for the Person of Christ and His religious teaching, the defenders of the Materialistic Interpretation of History were under the necessity of showing that the economic conditions at a certain period

in the history of mankind were such as to call for reform, and that the movement known as Christianity was the expedient adopted by certain of the proletariat to relieve themselves from the pressure of economic burdens. In other words that all the elements which went to make up Christianity were pre-existent in the life or thought of the people, and that by a convergence of economic factors in the time of Augustus, these elements were synthesized and found expression as a communistic movement for social reform to which the name Christianity has been applied Two distinct streams of influence, it is said, contributed to the new movement, one originating in Rome, the other in Judea.

In Rome the causes which led to the proletariat effort for betterment, are, according to these writers, classed, either as social, political or intellectual. To these three sources it is claimed, can be traced all the elements which are afterwards found in the Christian communist movement. The social condition according to the manner in which it is described can be summed up as universal servitude; the political as class domination upheld by absolutism and characterized by oppression and extortion; the intellectual as chaotic, as shown in the general credulity, the growing spirit of humanity, and in the religious upheaval tending towards monotheism and internationalism. Here, it is represented, were all the elements, ready and suitable and needing only some skillful hand or perhaps a little additional pressure from the economic screws to be converted into Christianity. It would be interesting to follow the picture which the experts in the social sciences have painted of the economic conditions in Rome in the first years of the Empire, to learn in the language of the present as Ferrero has taught, what the actual conditions were, of the bad political bosses, the corrupt political rings, the capitalists and so forth, but all that has nothing to do with the origin of Christianity. The Christian religion did not originate in Rome, it was not preached by the sorely tried Roman proletariat, and even when they learned of it they do not seem to have taken to its practices or its doctrines very eagerly. Why,

then, speak of their miserable condition, of the cruelties of slave owners, of the vices of slavery, the destruction of free working classes, etc., in connection with the origin of Christianity when Christianity did not arise in the place where these conditions prevailed, nor among the people who fostered them. The fact of the matter is that Christianity was first preached in Palestine, the first Christian community was in Jerusalem, and Christian doctrines were carried by the Jews from Palestine to other parts of the world.

In order to show that Christianity was in the beginning a movement for social reform, and that it was a protest of the masses against the grinding conditions under which they lived, it would seem more reasonable to pay no attention to the place where it might have originated but to study in detail all the places where it first appeared, to find out what class of people it attracted and above all to determine exactly what it was that attracted them. In regard to this latter point, if there is any truth in Christian records, if there is any continuity, anything organic in Christian doctrine, it is certain that the members of the Christian communities were drawn together, through a common faith in Christ as the God made Man, as the Redeemer who had atoned for their sins, and through Whom they might hope for eternal salvation. All the facts we possess concerning the early missionary efforts of the Christians fail to reveal a single shred of evidence to prove that churches or congregations were organized with the purpose of relieving economic needs or of improving social conditions.

To go a little more into detail, the very places in which the Christian religion first took root, were precisely those portions of the Roman Empire where economic conditions were best. Syria which received Christianity directly from Jerusalem, became the second cradle of evangelization, and on the authority of Mommsen [22] we have the assurance that "the brilliant aspect of the conditions of Syria was the economic one." "In no city of antiquity was the enjoyment of

[22] *Provinces of the Roman Empire*, vol. II, p. 148 (Eng. trans.).

life so much the main thing, and its duties so incidental as in Antioch upon Daphne." [23] And yet it was among the citizens of this city of pleasure by the Orontes that the followers of Christ were first called Christians. So well established was the prosperity of Antioch that the wars and conquests of the third and fourth centuries do not seem to have interfered with the comfort of its inhabitants to any considerable extent. In the time of St. John Chrysostom, when the Christians in Antioch numbered about one hundred thousand, [24] a tenth part were rich, a tenth part were of the poor that have nothing at all, and the rest of the middle class." [25] There is no evidence to show that in the flourishing cities in Asia Minor, where St. Paul preached, in Corinth, in Ephesus, in Laodicea, etc., the people felt the stress of grinding poverty or oppression. Speaking of Asia Minor Mommsen says "Of this happiness of life there was abundance in Asia Minor under the Roman imperial government. 'No province of them all,' says an author living in Smyrna under the Antonines, 'has so many towns to show as ours, and none such towns as our largest. It has the advantage of a charming country, a favorable climate, varied products, a position in the centre of the Empire, a girdle of peaceful people, all round good order, rarity of crime, gentle treatment of slaves, consideration and goodwill from the rulers.'" [26] So too in other places, in Egypt, Africa and Gaul where the same level of pagan contentment with material things prevailed, Christianity was received, not as a means of alleviating economic needs, but as a response to the spiritual cravings of human nature. It is unquestionably true that there was much room for improvement in the conditions under which the populace in the time of Augustus were compelled to pass their lives; but it does the Plebs of Rome and the Roman Empire too much honor to give them credit for having judged their conditions by standards of life

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 140.
[24] *Hom. in Matt.*, LXXXV, 4.
[25] *Ibid.*, LXVI, 3.
[26] *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 384.

which have grown up since then. Their condition was deplorable because of its moral baseness, and its lack of a serious sense of the responsibility of existence, and consequently any opinion regarding their desire for change must be based on the point of view they possessed respecting life and its opportunities. On this point other historians do not judge the aspiring proletariat so favorably as do Kautsky and his colleagues. "We need not waste much compassion upon the life of the Roman working class," says Tucker.[27] "It is true that there was then no doctrine of the 'dignity of labor,' but, that there was a reasonable pride taken in a trade reputably maintained, is seen from the frequent appearance of its tools upon a tombstone. In respect of the mere enjoyment of life, the laborers of the Roman world were, so far as we can gather, tolerably happy. They had abundant holidays, mostly of religious origin; but like our own so frequently added to, and so far diverted from religious thoughts, that they were more marked by jollity and sport than by any solemnity of spirit."

On the other hand the people who formed the first Christian communities were not beggars, nor do they seem to have been discontented with their station in life. They were workingmen who plied their trades with success, and who were on a friendly footing with their well-to-do neighbors. From the time the earliest Christian communities were organised in the East, there were men and women in them who had wealth and station, and yet, at no time was their right to call themselves Christians questioned in any way, nor were they required, as a condition of membership, to abandon their possessions.

The most convincing proof, however, that Christianity did not originate as an economic movement among the masses is found in the fact that they were so slow to receive it. There were unquestionably thousands of unfortunates in Rome and elsewhere whose condition was deplorable in the extreme and who would gladly have accepted relief from any quarter. If Christianity was the reply which their oppression had formed in

[27] *Life in the Roman World of Nero and St. Paul*, p. 253.

answer to the universal demand for relief and betterment, why did they not accept what they themselves had called into being? It has been calculated that the number of Christians in the city of Rome in the middle of the third century was about 30,000, which, if the entire number of inhabitants is placed at 900,000, would amount to about one-thirtieth of the entire population or between three and five per cent. of the people of the city.[28] This brings up a problem which the upholders of the economic view of history will find hard to solve. They assume that the multitude, through the pressure of economic necessity, turned to a scheme of life which promised them relief and yet after two centuries of propaganda in the very place where the need for reform was most urgent, the very persons to whom the scheme owed its existence stood aloof from it. Economic interpretation has no answer to this riddle. The facts are, that in Rome, which it is assumed, was distinctively the church of the proletariat, there were from the beginning Christians of all classes and what is more confusing still the Church in Rome was not in the beginning drawn from the houseless and poverty stricken Romans but principally from the Greeks and converted Jews. From that nucleus there was formed the flourishing Church of later days which numbered among its members representatives of the oldest patrician families, senators, philosophers and consuls. If the great mass of the proletariat did not join the Christian community it was because their desires and aspirations were not such as would induce them to practise the life of renunciation, of self-sacrifice and of humble submission to the ills and inconveniences of life which Christian faith demanded. Thus it is clear that Christianity did not originate among the discontented masses in the Roman Empire, it came to them from the Jewish capital and was first preached by Jews, it did not gain its first adherents exclusively from among the proletariat to whom it penetrated generally only after the time when, on

[28] This is figure arrived at by Harnack after examining the opinions of Renan, Friedländer, Döllinger, etc. *Mission and Expansion of Christianity*, vol. II, p. 248 (Eng. trans.).

the confession of the upholders of the materialistic theory, it had lost all semblance of an economic movement. The other contention that Christianity in the beginning was essentially communistic in character is equally erroneous and misleading. The evidences of this communistic tendency, it is asserted, can be found in the class hatred which it fostered and in the destruction of family ties and the contempt for work which it engendered. How far this is from historic reality is clear from the entire course of Christian development. There is not a single fact in early Christian history which would tend to show that men were induced to join the Christian church through the hope of enjoying the benefits of a communistic regime. The only incident that can be adduced in favor of such a statement is that narrated in the Acts of the Apostles concerning the primitive Church in Jerusalem, when it is said "All they that believed were together, and had all things common. Their possessions and goods they sold and divided them to all according as every one had need." It is a perversion of the sense of this passage to see in it a legal ordinance requiring the surrender of personal property and not rather an exemplification of the brotherly love with which the first members of the Church were filled. In the memorable incident which has enriched the language of denunciation with the name of Ananias, we find rather a proof of the impossibility of any project of a communistic character, because as the Acts state, neither Ananias nor his wife were under any obligation to surrender their property. The incident related by Luke must be read in conjunction with his further statements on the subject of wealth and property, and his further description of the community in Jerusalem which shows that the church there contained rich as well as poor. The other assertions regarding the class hatred and the political insubordination of the early Christians are too far from the actual facts as history has revealed them to merit any attention. The truth is that Christianity had no social nor political programme, "if by programme is meant a set of definitely prescribed

regulations." [29] Neither the founder of Christianity nor His disciples troubled themselves about economic conditions nor contemporary circumstances. Had they done so Christianity would have ceased to exist with the conditions in which it was born. It might have served the needs of that day but its usefulness would have vanished with the next change in economic environment. If the gospel aimed at founding a community among men, this does not mean that it was communistic, unless as has been said "the transformation of the socialism which rests on the basis of conflicting interests into the socialism that rests on the consciousness of a spiritual unity and destiny" [30] can be called communistic.

There is no need to discuss the remaining counts in the economic indictment of the traditional view of the origin of Christianity. If the supposed social and economic environment which was ripe for reform cannot be considered as being in any way responsible for the birth of Christianity, then it is useless to pursue the followers of Marx in their task of tracing the scattered rays of light which at different times and in different places penetrated the pagan mind in the hope of building therefrom an intellectual environment as the source of Christian doctrines. Hence the attempt to apply the Materialistic Interpretation of History to the Origin of Christianity, as far as can be judged from the writings of those who uphold that system, fails at every point. It fails because it does not connect what its advocates are pleased to call economic cause with what they style economic result, because they fail to show any relation between the economic distress which called for reform and the economic relief offered by Christianity, or to present Christianity in the light of an economic movement. It is useless to conjecture what results an attempt of that kind might have yielded under the hands of competent historians, but nothing but failure could be anticipated from a method so arbitrary and unscientific in character as that

[29] Harnack, *What is Christianity?* Eng. Trans., p. 97.
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 100.

of attempting to build a Philosophy of phenomena without regard for pertinent facts. "The science of History is not something separate from the facts of history, but something contained in them, it is simply the meaning, the rational interpretation, the knowledge of the true nature and essential relations of the facts. It is the Philosophy of History." [31]

PATRICK J. HEALY.

[31] Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History*, p. 15.

INCREMENT VALUE TAXES IN GERMANY AND GREAT BRITAIN.

While there is truth in the proverb as to the certainty of taxes, there are few economic or fiscal questions upon which there is more uncertainty than that of the proper measure of taxation. Of the various theories which have been invoked to determine how the burden of taxation should be distributed among the subjects of a state, two especially have found wide favor, namely, the benefit theory (the amount of tax collected from the subject should be in proportion to the benefit which the subject receives from governmental activities), and the faculty or ability theory (the subject should pay to the state in proportion to his ability). The first of these was more widely accepted among economists a century ago than at present and is now upheld mainly by the lawyers. Present day writers on public finance are inclined to accept ability as the just measure in distributing the burden. But whichever theory we adopt we shall meet with difficulty in its practical application. With regard to the first-named theory, the benefit which we receive from government is in proportion to neither our wealth nor our income, for our lives and liberties are protected as well as our property. And if it were merely a question of property, the benefit from government would not necessarily be in exact *proportion* to the amount, for the man who has a million dollars' worth might be in a position to secure private police and thus not be benefitted ten times as much by the protection of the state as the man who has only one hundred thousand dollars' worth.

Accepting the faculty theory, on the other hand, we shall find a similar difficulty. Has A, whose income is a thousand dollars a year, the same ability to pay fifty dollars in taxes as has B, whose income is two thousand dollars, to pay twice

the amount? Clearly not, for A possibly has one hundred dollars left after securing the necessaries of life, while B undoubtedly has twice that surplus. It is, therefore, easier for B to pay one hundred dollars to the state than it is for A to pay fifty dollars. Clearly a *proportional* tax on income is not a true measure of ability to pay.

Some theorists have proposed that taxation should be progressive, that is, as the income increases not only the absolute amount of the tax but also the *rate* should increase. Other writers have proposed and legislators have enacted that a definite amount should be exempt from taxation and that a uniform rate or a nearly uniform rate be applied to the remainder. This is technically called degressive taxation. Most writers on public finance whether socialistic or conservative are inclined to agree that the tax system should be degressive or progressive and that strictly proportional taxation does not answer the demands of justice. Again, it is maintained that under the faculty theory, as a general thing an income which is due to personal services should not be taxed so heavily as an income from property. The personal services, it is argued, furnish an income only for a part of the lifetime of the individual and a greater part of it must be deducted to furnish the necessaries for that proportion of the life when the individual cannot work, whereas the income from property will continue through the lifetime of the owner and afterward. This thought found expression in the British income tax of 1907 granting "relief" to "earned" incomes under two thousand pounds. This "relief" has been continued and amplified in the later budget.

It is, of course, not necessary or desirable that every tax should be assessed in proportion to ability to pay. For example, an excise might be levied on beer under such circumstances that some poor men might contribute twice as much to the treasury as some rich men. But it is desirable that all of the taxes taken together should impose a burden as nearly as possible in proportion to the ability of the several taxpayers.

In fact, with the growing expenditures of the different nations it becomes necessary to seek out new sources of taxation and to levy the taxes with a finer discrimination for the needs of justice than was necessary in former times when a smaller revenue was required by the state. These demands for increased taxes have recently led the national governments of Germany and Great Britain to propose that a part of the "unearned increment" of land values be taken in taxation by the state. This suggestion, although it employs the phraseology of the "single taxers," is really not any more dangerous to the institution of private property in land than our American fiscal practice.

I.

When the Germans established a protectorate over Kiau Chow in 1898 it was seen that the German administration would effect a considerable increase in land values. Accordingly the value at that time was determined and an arrangement was made whereby one-third of the increase in the value of the land, in as far as such increase was not due to expenditure on the part of the owner, was taken by the government as a tax. In 1903 the city of Frankfort-on-Main introduced a similar tax on "unearned increment" (Wertzuwachssteuer). Under the Frankfort ordinance as amended in 1906 there was to be levied when a piece of real estate was sold (1) a two per cent. tax on the whole purchase price of the real estate and (2) an additional tax which varied under varying conditions. If the land was built upon and had not changed owners for twenty years, the second part of the tax amounted to from one to two per cent., depending upon the length of time which had elapsed since the last sale. If the land was not built upon and had not changed hands for twenty years the additional tax levied upon the purchase price was from two to six per cent., depending likewise upon the time which had elapsed. But if less than twenty years had elapsed since

a previous sale the additional tax was determined in the following manner, and this is the essence of the "increment value" tax: if the increase in value of the property amounted to fifteen per cent. since the last sale, a tax of two per cent. of the increase was collected. If the increase was twenty per cent., three per cent. was collected. If twenty-five per cent., four per cent was taken and so on, one per cent. being added to the tax rate for every five per cent. increase in value. This increase in the tax rate continued up to the point at which twenty-five per cent. of the increase was taken in taxes.

In 1905 Cologne introduced an increment tax similar to that of Frankfort. In Cologne the increment tax begins with a rate of ten per cent. of the increase where the increase in value amounts to ten per cent. The rate advances rapidly until twenty-five per cent. of the "unearned increment" is taken.

Hamburg, from 1903 to 1908, required profit made on real estate transactions to be reckoned as income and to be taxed under the income tax. This was of course the increment value tax in another form. On account of the ease with which citizens of Hamburg could and did change their place of residence to avoid paying the tax it was found advisable to change the tax to an increment value tax, thus making it a real instead of a personal tax and collectible where the land was located rather than where the owner had his residence.

The increment value tax was accepted pretty widely by German municipalities at the time of its adoption last year by Berlin. In many of the cities it has yielded a large revenue. In February of the present year it was adopted as a German imperial tax, and is expected to furnish about twenty million marks annually for the imperial treasury. The municipalities are to be permitted to continue to levy the tax but the local and "state" rate must not exceed the imperial rate and together they are not to exceed thirty per cent. of the future "unearned increment" of land values.

II.

The present constitutional struggle in Great Britain is due chiefly to the opposition of the House of Lords to the tax on "unearned increment." The Government brought in a finance bill which was passed by the Commons but rejected by the Lords principally on account of the land increment duty. An appeal was taken to the people and the Government felt that it was sustained sufficiently to warrant it in bringing in the same bill again. This time (April 1910) the Lords allowed it to become law. The Finance Act 1910, levies three different duties on land values, namely, the increment value duty, the undeveloped land duty and the reversion duty. The increment value duty is levied at the rate of twenty per cent. on the difference between the site value of the land when the duty becomes due and its site value on the thirtieth day day of April, nineteen hundred and nine. By site value is meant the value of the land irrespective of improvements. The duty becomes due on the occasion of any transfer of the fee simple of the land or of any interest in the land or of any grant or a lease of the land for a longer term than fourteen years. Provision is also made for the periodical collection of the duty where the land is held by a corporation or by a body unincorporate. Of course the twenty per cent. tax is to be collected only once upon any specific part of the increment. Bonâ fide agricultural land is exempt from the payment of the duty. The tax will be felt principally by the landowners in growing towns.

Under the system of long term leases prevalent in Great Britain it usually happens, especially in the larger cities, that at the termination of the lease the value of the interest of the lessor is greatly enhanced. Under the Act of 1910 it is provided that on such occasions where the term of the lease exceeds twenty-one years a tax of ten per cent. on such increase in value, known as the reversion duty, shall be

collected. Agricultural land is exempt from the payment of this duty also. Where the same increment of value is subject both to reversion duty and to the increment value duty, only twenty per cent. of the increment shall be collected.

The undeveloped land duty is an annual tax of one-half penny in the pound (equal to about two mills on the dollar) on land which has not been developed by the erection of dwelling houses or of buildings for the purposes of any business, trade or industry other than agriculture. This duty is not to be charged if the site value of the land does not exceed fifty pounds per acre. Provision is also made for the exemption of parks and open places to which the public may have access. The purpose of this measure is to make it unprofitable to keep land from being built upon when there is a demand for it for that purpose.

FRANK O'HARA.

BOOK REVIEWS.

The World of Homer, by Andrew Lang, with illustrations. Longmans, Green, and Co. 39 Paternoster Row, London, New York Bombay and Calcutta. 1910. 8vo, pp. xvi + 306.

The contents of the work may be indicated briefly by quoting the headings of the chapters. Homer's World. The Four Ages (1-9); Homeric Lands and Peoples (10-20); Homeric Polity. The Over Lord (21-27); Homer's World in Peace (28-33); Men and Women (34-44); The Homeric World in War (45-50); Homeric Tactics (51-59); Men's Dress in Homer. Armour (60-80); Women's Costume (81-95); Bronze and Iron. Weapons and Tools (96-104); Burial and the Future Life (105-112); Religion in Greece: Pre-Historic, Homeric, and Historical (113-127); Temples. Altars. Ritual. Purification (128-136); Homer and Ionia (137-153); Attic *versus* Achaean Traditions (154-160); Homer and "the Saga" (161-187); The Story of Palamedes (188-196); Homer and the Cyclic Poems (197-221); The Great Discrepancies (222-245); Conclusions (246-255). Appendixes. The Catalogue (257-259); The Supposed Expurgation of Homer (260-280); The Alleged Athenian Rescension of Homer (281-288); The Lost Epics and the Homeric Epics (Wiederholungen) (289-294); Index (295 ff.).

The book shows the same brilliant polemical style which was recognized in the author's *Homer and his Age*, and is devoted to the exposition of the same fundamental ideas. My opinion of these ideas has recently been set forth in a *Bulletin* article, *Homeric Armor and Mr. Lang*, and the reading of the present book has not caused me to modify my opinions. For reasons explained in my article it seems to me that the interests of the *Bulletin* readers cannot be served by general criticism of such works, but only by a detailed analysis of their treatment of some one topic. It is possible that I may return to this book in such a fashion; and, if so, will select the chapter *Homer and the Cyclic Poets*.

In the meantime I may mention two trifles in passing. Fig.

7.—*Lady Pouring out Wine for Warrior,* is commented on as follows: "In the third picture (fig. 7) a warrior, fully armed, has his hand in the richly adorned belt (*zoster*) which he is fixing over the juncture of corslet and mailed kirtle." p. 77. Looking at the illustration one can see that Mr. Lang has fallen victim to a trick of perspective. The warrior is holding 'a richly adorned' flat vessel to catch the wine, and as it is level with his waist Mr. Lang has taken it for a belt.

In explaining the wounding of Menelaos in the fourth book of the *Iliad,* Mr. Lang writes, p. 76: 'When the arrow is extracted (line 216) the corslet is not mentioned, as I suppose because the arrow passed through the place where the corslet clasped in front. When the corslet was unclasped the arrow had only to be pulled out of the belt and kirtle." According to Homer the arrow struck where 'the corslet met the blow double,' according to Mr. Lang it strikes where there is no corslet to meet it. The true interpretation of this passage which was long a crux has been given by Robert; it shows how the wound could be treated without 'unclasping the corslet' of which act there is no mention in the text.

G. M. Bolling.

Le droit ecclesiastique matrimonial des calvinistes français, par Joseph Faurey. Paris. Librairie de la Société Recueil Sirey. 1910. Pp. 149.

Not a few readers, probably, will consider that the value of this work is increased by the fact that it is not only an interesting and thorough exposition of the laws enacted by the Calvinists of France to govern the marriage contract, but also a comparison of those laws with the canons of the Catholic Church on that important subject. After an introduction dealing at some length with the matrimonial discipline of the Catholic Church, the author, who is a Catholic, studies exhaustively the many enactments of Calvinistic synods regarding engagements, impediments, the solemnization and effects of marriage, divorce and remarriage.

On four principal heads a marked opposition is noted between Catholic and Calvinistic ordinances,—the sacramental character of marriage, the range of impediments, mixed marriages and

divorce. For the Calvinists marriage is merely a contract of natural law; their impediments are certain degrees of affinity and of consanguinity, defect of consent of the parties or of their parents, impotency, age, difference of religion, and bewitchedness; in more recent times they tolerate mixed marriages, but during a long period marriages between Catholics and members of the Reformed Church were absolutely forbidden, the Catholic party being always required to abjure "papisme" and profess Calvinism; they allow divorce for adultery, for malicious desertion, for prolonged absence, and also when a married priest or monk returns to the Church.

The treatment throughout is accurate and painstaking, the comparisons instituted between Catholic and Protestant teaching are well done, the bibliographical references are valuable, and the work deserves to be highly recommended.

JOHN T. CREAGH.

Summa Iuris Ecclesiastici Publici, auctore Augustino Bachofen, O. S. B., S. T. D. Rome, Pustet. 1910. Pp. 156. ($1.50 bound).

One does not look for much in the way of novelty in an exposition of the public law of the Church, nevertheless new literature on this topic is always read with interest. Father Bachofen's work is, as was to be expected, mostly a restatement of what had been often said before, but he has taken pains to incorporate the latest literature and the most recent decisions, and has arranged his matter in a new way, under the three heads,—De Iure Constitutivo, De Iure Gubernativo, De Iure Internationali.

This is the first book on our public law in which a President of the United States has been cited as an authority—a brief passage from one of the speeches of "clarissimus Roosevelt" is quoted—or readers have been referred to a number of the New York Freeman's Journal. We are glad that occasion is taken to deny and refute Aichner's assertion that the United States is "status pure atheus."

Father Bachofen is already well known to American readers through his excellent "Compendium Iuris Regularium," and the same soundness of doctrine and clearness of exposition that won

for that earlier work so favorable a reception characterize this present treatise on a still more difficult subject. We recommend it heartily to all who desire to possess a compendious, thoroughly up-to-date and reliable explanation of the public law of the Church.

JOHN T. CREAGH.

De Administrativa Amotione Parochorum, seu Commentarium in Decretum "Maxima Cura." A Sac. Felix M. Capello. Rome, Pustet, 1911. Pp. 124. (Bound, 80 cents).

La Rimozione dei Parroci in Via Disciplinare secondo il Recentissimo Decreto "Maxima Cura." 2nd ed. Naples, D'Auria, 1911. Pp. 41.

Important as the decree *Maxima Cura* is for parish priests in every country, it assumes a special importance in the United States, where it will assimilate removable to irremovable rectors in so far as purely administrative transfers and removals are concerned, and thus effect a serious change in the discipline of the Church in this country. This explains the general desire to become better acquainted with the meaning and operation of the new law, and the interest which has attached to it especially since the Consistorial Congregation decided that there can be no doubt about the application of the *Maxima Cura* to the United States.

The above-mentioned works are both clear and thorough commentaries on the decree. Dr. Capello's exposition being somewhat fuller than that of the Marquis de Gennaro.

JOHN T. CREAGH.

Recollections of Abraham Lincoln (1847-1865). By Ward Hill Lamon, edited by Dorothy Lamon Teillard: Published by the Editor, Washington, D. C., 1911. Pp. 337 + xxxvi.

It would not be easy to prepare on the career of Abraham Lincoln a book that would not find a few readers. His fame has attracted all sorts of pens, eminent as well as obscure. Few of his characteristics have altogether escaped observation, and but

a few of his achievements have failed to beget a monograph or a book. The life and the public career of the great war President is so attractive a theme that many writers have yielded to its fascination and with meagre information have given us books that are really readable. For its popularity, however, this work, which has long been familiar in another form, is not indebted to the intrinsic interest of its subject. Ward Hill Lamon did not belong to the class of writers which culls from works in prose and verse impressions of the great Emancipator, and with the patience of the worker in mosaic imparts to minute and dissimilar materials something of color and of form. He saw clearly the events that were passing before his eyes. He has been sharply censured for making of President Lincoln a human being and for ascribing to him some human limitations. Nevertheless, it is well known to students of the era of the Civil War that Colonel Lamon was among the most intelligent of Lincoln's admirers and that he was certainly the most devoted of his friends. Indeed, except, Ignatius Donnelly, a Representative from Minnesota, in the 38th Congress, no eminent public character of that epoch appears to have seen so clearly the real Lincoln and to have described so accurately the place that he was destined to occupy in the chronicles of time. Addressing the House of Representatives on one of the Reconstruction measures Mr. Donnelly said:

"I am aware, Mr. Speaker, of the great claims which Mr. Lincoln has upon the people of the United States. I recognize that popularity which accompanies him, and which, considering the ordeal through which he has passed, is little less than miraculous. I recognize that unquestioning faith in his honesty and ability which pervades all classes, and the sincere affection with which almost the entire population regard him. We must not underrate him even in our praises. He is a great man. Great not after the old models of the world, but with a homely and original greatness. He will stand out to future ages in the history of these crowded and confused times with wonderful distinctness. He has carried a vast and discordant population safely and peacefully through the greatest of political revolutions with such consummate sagacity and skill that while he led he appeared to follow; while he innovated beyond all precedent he has been denounced as tardy; while he struck the shackles from the limbs of three million slaves he has been hailed as a conservative! If to adapt, persistently and continuously, just and righteous principles to all the perplexed windings and changes of human events, and to secure in the end the complete triumph of those

principles, be statesmanship, then Abraham Linoln is the first of statesmen."[1]

This was the estimate of a radical Republican who did not believe in President Lincoln's plan for restoring the erring States to their normal relations in the Union. On that subject Colonel Lamon could not have disagreed with his old friend. He would assuredly not have criticised Lincoln while the conflict raged.

For the most eventful part of Lincoln's career Marshal Lamon alone was qualified to speak with authority. Readers of his interesting biography have often regretted that he did not tell more of the President's theory of reconstruction. In all probability he has told us as much as Mr. Lincoln himself knew, for with his remarkable sagacity the President, while forever reflecting upon the great problems that oppressed him, was not accustomed to announce in advance a policy to which consistency required him afterwards to adhere. It was Mr. Lincoln's practice to meet the emergencies of the moment by the contrivances of the moment, at least so far as concerned *new* questions. As is well known, he often found himself drifting out upon perilous seas. In other words, he was compelled to cut loose from the towing ropes of tradition.

Messrs. Nicolay and Hay, the thrifty secretaries of President Lincoln, have written a useful and interesting history of those troublous times. Their work has its value, but it is not to be expected that even intelligent clerks could have enjoyed the same confidence as did the former law partner and the cherished and devoted friend of the President. In their voluminous work speculation may fairly claim a place. With the brief sketch of Colonel Lamon it would have been entirely out of harmony. His information was obtained at first hand. It is greatly to be regretted that he did not find an opportunity of telling us more concerning the secret history of those stirring times.

The present edition, by including a memoir of Marshal Lamon and also a considerable number of letters addressed to him by eminent contemporaries, is a very useful as well as a very reliable work. For the first time the general reader sees the standing of Ward H. Lamon, and the opinion which the great men of Illinois and of the country entertained of his influence with the President.

[1] *Lincoln's Plan of Reconstruction*, 245-246.

Indeed, his character and intelligence required no vindication. His book is a sufficient proof of his intellectual attainments. That he enjoyed the continued and intimate friendship of Mr. Lincoln is undoubted proof that he was no pedestrian character. Every student of the era of the Civil War has been placed under obligations to Mrs. Teillard by this new edition of her distinguished father's book.

As we have just remarked, the Appendix contains many documents that add materially to our knowledge of Mr. Lincoln. Of these additions perhaps the most interesting is an excerpt from a letter of 1855 to his old friend Joshua F. Speed. In it Lincoln says: "You enquire where I now stand. That is a disputed point. I think I am a Whig; but others say there are no Whigs, and that I am an Abolitionist. I am not a Know-Nothing! that is certain. How could I be? How can any one who abhors the oppression of negroes be in favor of degrading classes of white people? Our progress in degeneracy appears to me to be pretty rapid. As a nation we began by declaring that '*All men are created* equal.' We now practically read it, 'All men are created equal except negroes.' When the Know-Nothings get control it will read, 'All men are created equal, except negroes and foreigners and Catholics.' When it comes to this, I should prefer emigrating to some country where they make no pretence of loving liberty,—where despotism can be taken pure, and without the base alloy of hypocrisy."

The reader is probably aware that the same opinion was held by Horace Greeley, though the famous editor of the *Tribune* did not give so clear a statement of his reasons for that opinion.

CHAS. H. MCCARTHY.

Francis Bacon: A Drama. By Mervyn Murray. The Albert F. Grazer Company, Spokane, Washington, 1911.

A notable contribution to the Bacon *vs.* Shakespeare controversy has just appeared. It is entitled "Francis Bacon," and is a play in five acts, in which certain phases of Bacon's career from his early manhood to his death are vividly set forth. The author is a distinguished lawyer who veils his identity under the alliterative

pseudonym of Mervyn Murray. His knowledge of happenings in the spacious days of great Elizabeth is great and intimate. The vehicle of expression that he uses is blank verse, and he handles it with superb ease, rising at times to a sonority and a dignity which recall Marlowe's mighty line. If the metre has a fault it is too uniformly regular, and that in scansion emphasis has to be laid too often on unaccented or unimportant syllables.

The method employed is to take for granted the fact that Bacon wrote the poems and plays and, in order to save himself from any imputation of frivolity, passed them off as Shakespeare's; and on that assumption to bring together such a cumulus of proof from all quarters as to leave on the mind of the reader no doubt of the correctness of the original thesis. The scene (Act II, Sc. I.) in which the pact is made between Bacon and Shakespeare is cleverly conceived to show the contrast between the fat and clumsy, the money-grubbing and almost illiterate boor from Stratford and the lofty intellectual "Columbus of inductive thought." The whole thing is so naturally done that, if you could think of any one bearing to its perusal a virgin mind, there is no doubt that conviction would follow that the real author was Bacon, and that by no stretch of imagination could Shakespeare be supposed to be the writer. This impression is heightened by the later scene between Bacon and Ben Jonson in which, Shakespeare being now dead, Bacon arranges with Jonson to write the laudatory lines on Shakespeare prefixed to the first folio of the plays with the object of still keeping up the original delusion. Elsewhere, by a splendid literary device, the author of the beautiful lines from *The Merchant of Venice* beginning

"How sweet the moonlight sleeps upon this bank!"

is shown to be Bacon; and so throughout.

The opinion that Bacon wrote the poems and plays that go under the name of Shakespeare is diametrically opposed to the view entertained by the writer of this notice; but candour compels the admission that this play is the most plausible piece of pro-Baconism that has been for a long time put forward. Its assumption of the whole case carries one off one's feet. Mervyn Murray has no need of the tactics of sapping a solemn creed with solemn sneer or of abusing the other side: calmness of assumption and proof piled

on proof without any appearance of argumentation are the weapons he so effectively uses.

Incidentally, we are introduced to Queen Elizabeth, to Lord Burleigh, to the Earl of Essex, and to other personages who played important parts in the high heroic time of the last of the Tudors, and in every case there is some deft character-sketching. There are thirteen full page illustrations. The little book is splendidly printed and turned out by the Albert F. Grazer Company of Spokane, Washington.

P. J. Lennox.

The Inner Life and the Writings of Dame Gertrude More. Revised and edited by Dom Benedict Weld-Blundell, Monk of the Order of St. Benedict. 2 vols., pp. xlii + 310 and xvi + 290. Benziger Brothers, New York, Cincinnati, Chicago. 1910 and 1911.

Helen (afterwards Dame Gertrude) More was, apparently, one of those saintly beings who are made perfect in a short space. A great-great-granddaughter of Henry the Eighth's famous Lord Chancellor, Blessed Sir Thomas More, she was born March 25, 1606, at Low Leyton in Essex, England; she died in her twenty-eighth year August 17, 1633, at Cambray, France. In 1623 she was induced by Father Benet Jones, O. S. B., to join eight other maidens who passed over from England to France to enter the religious state in the Benedictine order in a monastery founded under the title of Our Lady of Consolation at Cambray. She had grave doubts as to her vocation, and even after her profession, made through the Archbishop on January 1, 1625, she was so uneasy in her mind regarding its validity that she afterwards asked and obtained permission to renew her vows privately to the President.

She was, it appears, suffering from wrong direction: the confessors assigned to the community followed one another in quick succession; being mostly men of mature years who had been for long periods on the English mission, they were more accustomed to the work of trying to save souls than fitted to direct contemplatives. When things were in a very bad way spiritually with Dame Gertrude, when her natural virtues had decayed and her

soul, in her own words, "was grown to be as hard as a stone as to God and divine things," and she thought of removing to some other house of her order, she was induced to place herself under the direction of Father Augustine Baker. This pious man had left England in consequence of a proclamation banishing all priests, and he was sent by his superiors to Cambray. Many of the nuns sought his advice and direction and profited greatly by it: Dame Gertrude, thinking that there was peril in his method of direction and that therefore he was safer left alone, was the last to apply to him. The results at first were not very encouraging, and, as Father Baker himself tells us, she mocked and jested in her gifted way at those who followed his instructions. When she noted that her sisters were better or more at peace through these instructions she said to them, "Ah, it is well for you that you can get good from them, for I can get none."

Accordingly, she stayed away from Father Baker for several months, but at length, towards the close of the same year in which she had made her profession, she was persuaded by her Mistress to try him again. This time all went well. Father Baker enabled her, as he phrases it, to "get into her interior," and put her in the way of effective prayer, and for the remainder of her life she strictly adhered to the course he laid down for her.

The first of the volumes here under review is Father Baker's exposition of how he led Dame Gertrude along the path of perfection. Incidentally, it is a defence of his own method of direction, which was formally called into question by his superiors, but, on full investigation, was triumphantly vindicated. A human as well as a highly devotional interest attaches to the chapter in which is told the tale of her last sickness and death. When the end came she had been nearly ten years in religion and some seven years in the practice of that spiritual course which enabled her to live the life and die the death of a saint.

The second volume is divided into three parts. The first part contains the *Confessiones Amantis, or The Confessions of a Loving Soul,* being the prayers and meditations of Dame Gertrude. The second part consists of *Fragments* of other devotions which she wrote on loose sheets and kept in her breviary, and the third part contains her *Apology for herself and her Spiritual Guide and Director, Venerable Augustine Baker.* Parts I. and II. are mostly devotional and are certainly edifying. The fifty-three *Confessions*

in particular appear animated with something of that strain which we admire so much in the *Imitation of Christ*. The third part is disputatious, and, especially on the question of obedience, shows an independence of spirit and thought which, if not tempered by divine love, might conceivably be productive of trouble in a community of nuns.

The work is throughout on a high spiritual plane. It is not meant to have practical application to those who lead an active life, although such persons, too, can derive from it edification and consolation, and can learn a lesson on the non-advisability of the repetition of confessions. To those whom Providence has placed in the contemplative state it can scarcely fail to be of excellent use and to afford profitable reading.

The two volumes passed the Censor, and bear the imprimatur of the Vicar General of the Archdiocese of Westminster. They are very well edited. Some of Father Baker's sentiments, which, standing alone, might appear to be "hard sayings," are so judiciously interpreted and explained in foot-notes by Dom Benedict Weld-Blundell that, seen in this light, they commend themselves to our acceptance. A special word of praise is due to the preface and to the index, nor should the clearness of the type and the two fine illustrations be forgotten.

P. J. LENNOX.

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1. **Geoffroy Chaucer,** par Emile Legouis, professor à la Sorbonne. I vol. in 16o de la collection des *Grands Écrivains Étrangers*. Ouvrage orné d'un portrait hors texte. Prix: 2 fr. 50. Paris, Bloud et Cie, 7, place Saint-Sulpice. Pp. vii. + 261. 1910.

2. **Les Soeurs Brontë,** par Ernest Dimnet. I vol. in 16o de la collection des *Grands Écrivains Étrangers*. Ouvrage orné d'un portrait. Prix: 2 shillings. Paris, Bloud et Cie, 7, place Saint-Sulpice. Pp. xii. + 276. 1910.

3. **La Jeunesse de Shelley,** par A. Koszul, docteur ès lettres. 1 vol. in 16o. Prix: 4 francs. Paris, Bloud et Cie, 7, place Saint-Sulpice. Pp. xxii + 439. Deuxième Édition, 1910.

The recent publication of the three foregoing volumes shows the

attraction which the great names in English literature continue to hold for people of other lands. It may be at once said that all three books afford most valuable and interesting reading. In each case the appreciation of the English writer under notice is most intelligent.

M. Legouis has evidently made a careful study of the Chaucerian period. Chaucer's relations with John of Gaunt, Edward III., Richard II., and Henry IV. are clearly traced with an abundance of detail which to many readers will come in the nature of a revelation. French and Italian influences on the formation of Chaucer's style are vividly pointed out in two very interesting chapters (II. and IV.). M. Legouis falls foul of the commonly accepted theory that there were three successive periods in Chaucer's poetic development, French, Italian, and English. He claims that the French influence was a constant quantity. "Il n'est pas un moment," he says, "où l'influence française ne se soit exercée sur Chaucer; elle est non moins manifeste dans les *Contes de Canterbury* que dans le *Livre de la Duchesse*."

M. Legouis devotes a chapter to what he calls "Les Poèmes Allégoriques," namely, the *Dethe of Blaunche the Duchesse* ("The Book of the Duchess"); the *Parlement of Foules;* the *Hous of Fame;* and the *Legende of Good Women,* and makes of each a careful examen. Of the *Dethe of Blaunche the Duchess* he says:

"C'est le premier poème en langue anglaise où l'art atteigne par endroits à sa plénitude. Ceci doit être affirmé sans aucune restriction."

Naturally, in tracing the Italian influence on Chaucer, M. Legouis dwells et same length on *Troilus and Creseyde,* which is based directly on the *Filostrato* of Boccaccio. He correctly describes the *Troilus* as

"le premier grand poème d'amour en langue anglaise, celui qui n'aura de pendant que le jour où Shakespeare prendra à un autre Italien le thème de *Romeo et Juliette*."

The three chapters in which the *Canterbury Tales* are discussed, analysed, and critically studied are very valuable. The importance of the *Tales* in the literature of the world M. Legouis thus summarises:

"C'est le jour où il choisit un sujet anglais qu'il devient un poète fait pour tous les pays. Il le devient parce que du même coup il dégage de la servitude sa vraie nature. Sentant ses forces

suffisantes, il se fonde sur l'observation. Il dira ce qu'il a vu; il exprimera directement sa vision personelle de la vie et des hommes."

Not the least noticeable feature in the book is the way in which M. Legouis, using all the liberty of the fourteenth century with regard to hiatus and ignoring the alternation of masculine and feminine rhymes, renders portions of Chaucer into spirited French verse. Compare, for example, the original description of the Clerk of Oxenford with this translation:—

Un clerc d'Oxford était de notre bande,
Dont la science en logique était grande;
Tout épilé luisait son vieux manteau;
Plus maigre était son bidet qu'un râteau
Et lui n'était guère plus gras, j'avoue:
Sous un front grave il avait creuse joue,
Trop peu mondain pour gagner un office
Ou dans l'Eglise atteindre un bénéfice.
A son chevet aimait-il mieux avoir
Vingt livres grands vêtus en rouge ou noir,
Un Aristote et ceux de son école
Que riche habit belle harpe ou viole

There is a great treat in store for those who will study attentively the *Chaucer* of M. Legouis.

In *Les Soeurs Brontë* M. Dimnet sets himself the difficult task of interpreting to his countrymen the temperaments of three literary women totally alien to the French mind. He has succeeded admirably. His narrative is plain, direct, and straightforward; his critical insight is remarkable; and his sympathy, while not morbidly pathetic, is generous and heartfelt. He gives us true, telling, and abiding pen-pictures of Charlotte, Emily, and Anne Brontë, and brings out vividly the tragedy of their lives. His analysis of *Jane Eyre,* of *Shirley,* of *Villette,* and of *Wuthering Heights* leaves nothing to be desired.

M. Dimnet has a very sane outlook on literature and on life. He judges correctly the self-suppression of Charlotte Brontë. The wisdom of his words may not appeal to an age which makes a fetish of art for art's sake; but to the right thinker that wisdom will be apparent. Take for example the following sentences, which occur towards the end of the volume:—

"Cependant une leçon et un encouragement sortent de cette petite vie manquée. Notre siècle est matérialiste, utilitaire et court: il voit une honte dans l'échec. On n'entend parler que du devoir de se réaliser soi-même. Bien analysée cette formule signifie ce que plus d'un dit tout haut qu'elle veut dire. Se réaliser soi-même c'est évaluer jusqu'au dernier centime ce que l'on croit valoir et n'en vouloir rien perdre; c'est penser qu'on est dupe si l'on sacrifie son bonheur du moment à un avenir problématique ou au bonheur d'autrui. Il se trouve une théologie pour affirmer qu'on plaît à Dieu quand ou se plaît à soi-même. A ce compte Charlotte Brontë fut bien sotte. . . . Mais un retour viendra. On reverra clairement quelque jour que le talent n'est pas l'homme, que l'inspiration est un accident, que le poème n'est que trop souvent supérieur au poète et que l'écrivain vieillissant voit ses livres s'éloigner de lui comme des enfants étrangers. On remettra la littérature à sa place, qui est secondaire, comme on y remet déjà l'intelligence. On ne se fera plus des dieux d'hommes qui n'auront que le brillant, on n'aura plus un culte matérialiste pour ce qu'on appelle leurs reliques. Ce jour-là, on n'ira plus en pèlerinage à Haworth où la poussière des Brontë achèvera de se dissoudre, mais Charlotte paraîtra grande d'avoir, ayant du génie, consenti à vivre et mourir petite."

M. Dimnet has of course availed himself of the labours of his predecessors—Mrs. Gaskell, Clement Shorter, Mrs. Humphry Ward, Augustine Birrell, Eugène Forcade, Emile Montégut, Mme. Darmesteter, M. de Wizewa, and M. Maeterlinck—but none the less he has succeeded in giving us a work which is stamped with the originality which individuality confers.

La Jeunesse de Shelley is a remarkable work. Distinguished by an almost Teutonic attention to detail, it is saved from being cumbersome or merely chronological because the author so clearly establishes the interaction between the poet's life and experience on the one hand and his work on the other. Of a study of cause and effect, of poetic genesis from surroundings alike objective and subjective, there is here given a most lucid demonstration. M. Koszul is evidently quite at home with the literary and political history of early nineteenth century England. He brings out vividly Shelley's relations with the members of his father's household, with Harriet Grove, Harriet Westbrook, Thomas Jefferson Hogg,

Elizabeth Hichener, Southey, Byron, Keats, Godwin, Mary Godwin, Jane Clairmont ("Clara"), Pecock, and Leigh Hunt. The ghastly tragedies of Harriet Westbrook and Fanny Godwin are told simply but in a way well calculated to rivet the reader's attention. Much patient investigation of Shelley's earlier literary efforts is shown, and to those who know the poet only by his greater works this section will afford a series of delightful surprises. The examens of *Queen Mab,* of *Alastor,* of *Julian and Maddalo* (taken out of its time order) and of *Laon and Cythna* (afterwards called *The Revolt of Islam*) are, each in its own way, fine examples of what is meant by analytical insight.

The narrative ends in 1818, with Shelley's final departure from England. It is to be hoped that M. Kuszul will take up the theme where he left it off, and give us his complete picture of the great poet, for there is magnificent material still to be dealt with.

In the eleven pages of the "Conclusion" there is some telling constructive criticism expressed in a sustained style which is the outward symbol of thoughts that lie deep. In particular the relations of Shelley to Romanticism are judicially weighed out and set forth. We are made to see plainly the longings of an unsatisfied religious need which are found in him as well as in Schlegel, Novalis, Wordsworth, Chateaubriand, and de Vigny; and the clash of eternally opposed philosophic tendencies, the resultant of a revolt from an established order of thought, is clearly heard in an eloquent and fascinating, if somewhat involved, paragraph.

The final passage expresses so well the poetic doctrine by which M. Koszul believes Shelley to have been animated that this notice may be appropriately closed by quoting it:—

"Par une conséquence naturelle, le poète absorbant en lui tout l'homme, il devenait en art ce qu'il avait été en politique et en philosophie: un individualiste: moins que tout autre de ses contemporains il se souciera désormais de la socialité de sa muse. Et à la fin, il saura voir clairement ce rôle spécifique de la poésie, il osera accepter hautement cet enseignement qui, disant simplement 'le meilleur de nous-mêmes en nos meilleurs moments' (*A Defence of Poetry.* 1821), chantant spontanément quelque vision fugitive, quelque éphémère tendresse, se trouve être plus durable et précieux que les systèmes patiemment élaborés par le concours des savants, des philosophes ou des hommes d'état: 'Les poètes, s'écriera-t-il, sont les législateurs méconnus du monde!' Et si

peut-être il n'aura pas toujours pleine conscience de tout ce que suppose cette fière parole, il n'en sera pas moins l'éclatante preuve qu'un poète, parti de la plus intransigeante haine des mysticismes systématisés et formulés, ne devient grand, profond et humain, qu'en ranimant pour lui-même le mysticisme fluide qui est la source vivante de tous les autres, et, selon Emerson, l'essence même de la poésie."

P. J. Lennox.

BOOK NOTICES.

Among recent contributions to our text-book literature in philosophy are two little volumes of the series LEITFADEN DER PHILOSOPHISCHEN PROPÄDEUTIK by Professor Peter Vogt. They are entitled *Logik* and *Psychologie,* published by Herder, St. Louis, 1911, and sell for 90 cents each.

From the same publishing house comes a beautiful volume on THE GRACES OF INTERIOR PRAYER, by Father Poulain, S. J., translated by Leonora L. Yorke Smith. It is a treatise on a most important portion of Catholic mystical theology, a very welcome addition to our English literature on the subject. The price of the volume is Three Dollars.

A new and enlarged edition of THE SPIRIT OF ST. FRANCIS DE SALES has recently been published by Benziger Brothers, price $1.80, net. It is not necessary to speak of the merits of this treatise on the Christian Virtues by one who, while he was a devoted admirer, was also a critical observer of the saintly bishop.

The series entitled *Economie Sociale,* published by Gabalda et Cie, 90 rue Bonaparte, Paris, may be recommended to all Catholic students of Economics. The latest volume is from the pen of Professor Lepelletier. It discusses a very important social-economic problem under the title CAISSES D'ÉPARGNE. The price of the volumes of this series is Two Francs each.

From an entirely different point of view, Edgar Gardner Murphy, author of "The Present South," discusses one of our domestic problems, under the title THE BASIS OF ASCENDENCY. The volume is published by Longmans, Green and Company.

LITTLE SERMONS ON THE CATECHISM is the title of a volume published by Joseph F. Wagner, New York. It is a translation from the Italian of Cosimo Corsi, Cardinal-Archbishop of Pisa. The price is One Dollar.

Bloud et Cie, 7 Place St. Sulpice, Paris, are the publishers of a series entitled *Etudes de morale et de sociologie*, to which Maurice Legendre has just contributed an important study LE PROBLÈME DE L'ÉDUCATION, Price, francs 3.50. The work is a calm dispassionate presentation of the claims which Catholics, all the world over, are urging in the matter of religious instruction.

Students of Moral Theology will be interested in the latest contribution to the Treatise on Conscience, entitled TRACTATUS DE CONSCIENTIA. It is published by Desclée of Tournai, and on sale by Herder, St. Louis. The author is Father Beaudoin, O. P.

EARLY FIRST COMMUNION, by Father Zulueta, S. J., is a timely topic, which will interest pastors and teachers. It is published by Benziger Brothers.

Seminary Professors and Spiritual Directors as well as Confessors will welcome Abbé Hurtaud's LA VOCATION AU SACERDOCE, a substantial volume of 453 pages published by Gabalda, 90 rue Bonaparte, Paris.

A beautiful little volume on an important phase of Apologetics, the relation between religion and science, has just come from Herder, St. Louis. It is entitled CHRISTIANITY AND THE LEADERS OF MODERN SCIENCE and is from the pen of the Jesuit Father Kneller. The English translation by Mr. Kettle is provided with a Preface written by Father Thomas A. Finlay, S. J. The volume sells for One Dollar and Eighty Cents.

THE ORIGIN OF TRAGEDY by Dr. Ridgeway, published by the Cambridge University Press is a valuable aid to the student of the Greek Drama and is also of interest to the student of comparative literature. Type, illustrations, etc., are up to the usual standard of the Cambridge University Press.

The recent controversy concerning the Pope's Encyclical on St. Charles Borromeo gives timeliness to the publication of a volume entitled SAINT CHARLES BORROMEO, by Louise M. Stacpoole-Kenny, published by Benziger Brothers.

The Life and Teachings of Blessed John Ruysbroeck (1293-1381) is the subject of a volume by Dom Vincent, entitled A MEDIEVAL MYSTIC, New York, Benziger Brothers, 1911.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Power Plant and Engineering Laboratory: A New Central heating and electric power plant has recently been completed for the heating of the entire group of buildings comprising the University, as well as for the supply of all electric current required for the lighting and power in each of these buildings, and power in the laboratories. Prior to the construction of this central plant, the heating of the several buildings was supplied from independent boilers in the basement of each building, while the electric current for lighting and power was generated by a small steam driven electric plant located in the basement of McMahon Hall.

In planning the New Central Heating and Power Plant, the question of supplying the existing buildings, etc., satisfactorily and economically was not alone carefully considered, but, in addition, the new plant has been so designed as to be capable of ready extension of both its heating and electrical capacity to meet fully the increased demand upon the same, which will result from time to time from the addition of future buildings, additional laboratories, etc.

After careful consideration of the relative merits of a number of sites upon the University's property, it was finally decided to construct the new plant as near as possible to the tracks of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, so that by means of a siding, the fully loaded coal cars of the railroad could be run directly over the coal bunkers of the plant, and coal directly dumped into the same, thus minimizing the cost of coal handling, formerly an item of large expense on account of the isolated location of the various buildings.

In considering the installation of the Central Plant, also, full consideration was given to the advantages to be secured by concentration at one point of all noise, dirt, ashes, etc., incident to the production of power and, also, perhaps more

fully to the great lessening of the fire risk secured by removal from all of the present and future buildings of the University, of all necessity for use of boilers or fires of any character.

The heating and power plant is located in a two story and basement building, with the boilers, stokers, etc., installed in the basement, level with the floor of the coal bunkers, and with the fronts of the boilers directly opposite the same, thereby facilitating, by means of small firing cars, the conveying of the coal direct from the bunkers to the stokers. The coal bunkers, further, are of sufficient capacity to store the contents of approximately seven standard railroad coal cars, insuring the plant against stoppage due to the non-delivery of coal on account of strike, weather conditions, etc.

The basement of the building also provides space for all pumping apparatus and general equipment of the heating system, as well also as an isolated space for oil storage. In the basement stories are also located the main toilets of the building, locker rooms for students and the hydraulic laboratory of the Mechanical Engineering Courses of the University.

The Engine Room of the plant is on the first floor, and is provided with a gallery and stair leading to the boiler room, from which point the Engineer in charge has a full view of the plant. The first floor also provides space for the Engineer's Room, Laboratories, etc., and provides through stairway and vestibule, for access to the upper floor of the building.

The entire second floor is devoted exclusively to the electrical Laboratories, Class and Drawing Rooms, etc.

The boiler equipment of the plant which supplies all steam required for the heating of the entire group of present Buildings, operation of the electric lighting units, and all steam required in the Laboratories, consists, at the present, of three 200 horse-power, water tube boilers, these boilers are arranged with two in a single battery, and the third with space at the side for the future installation of an additional 400 horse-power boiler to meet the increased demands upon the plant, due to the growth of the University. Each of the boilers is equipped with automatic stokers, so that the boiler plant will

comply in all respects with the ordinances of the District of Columbia, as to smokeless operation, and at the same time be operated with the minimum amount of labor.

The boilers further are connected by a rectangular smoke breeching to a radial brick chimney, 125 feet high, located at the side of the Power Plant Building.

The equipment of the plant, for supplying electric current for lighting and power, consists of two, fifty kilowatt, direct current generators, each direct connected to an automatic simple, non-condensing steam engine; both units being located in the engine room on the first story of the building. In addition to providing in the Engine Room for the two present generating units, space has been provided for a larger additional generating unit, to meet, in the future, the increased demands upon the plant, incident to the extension of the University. Space has also been allowed for the installation of a small oil or gasoline engine electric unit, to furnish current during the summer months for such lighting as would be required by those of the University's Faculty who remain at the University during the summer. This has been planned so as to avoid the necessity of operating either of the large generating units or boilers, to supply such a small portion of the total capacity developed by the same.

To tie in and not change the arangement of the lighting in all of the present buildings of the University, which up to the present have been supplied by 125 volt, two wire direct current from the small power plant in McMahon Hall, and without the necessity of running excessively heavy two wire, 125 volt feeders from the plant to the main distribution Junction Board in McMahon Hall, a new three-wire, 125-250 volt feeder and pole line has been constructed from the plant to this building. With the three wire system further, as installed, additional buildings at remote parts of the University property, may be very readily supplied with current for lighting and power, and the amount of copper in the transmission lines reduced materially below that which would be necessitated by a two wire, 125 volt system. The present two wire branch feeders

from McMahon Hall to Caldwell and Albert Halls, and St. Thomas College, have also been each increased by a third conductor so as to provide for the supply of these buildings on the three wire system from the new plant.

The switchboard in the engine room consists of three generator panels, (one for each of the 50 kilowatt generators and one for the summer lighting unit;) one balancer panel, one feeder panel, and space at each end for addition of future generator and feeder panels. The panels of the switchboard are fitted with all necessary instruments, circuit breakers, etc., and in addition to supplying new three-wire lighting and power feeder to McMahon Hall, the feeder panel supplied also lighting and power in the plant and Laboratory Building, and all power required in the various laboratories.

From the power plant a system of underground steam mains has been constructed to a central point of distribution located near St. Thomas College building, from which point heating supply lines have already been constructed to the existing buildings of the University. The main steam lines from the power plant to this center of distribution have, however, been made of sufficient capacity to care for the heating requirements of a number of future additional buildings, and the arrangement of the central point of distribution has been made such as to permit in future, the ready construction of additional heating supply lines from this point to such additional buildings as may be erected.

In carrying out the construction of the new heating system, such changes as were incident to the alteration of the present heating apparatus of the existing buildings, have been made, and all of these buildings were operated in very satisfactory manner throughout all of the past winter from the new plant.

In the construction of the heating mains throughout the property of the University, every possible provision has been made to secure the maximum permanence of the work, and particularly where located below the ground, all piping has been laid in conduits of terra cotta and concrete of the most permanent character. Furthermore, wherever valves and con-

nections have been necessarily located below ground, large concrete pits have been constructed below the ground surface with cast iron manholes for access to the same. By this means the life of the whole piping installation should be increased to a material extent above that of the ordinary construction, wherein wooden or other forms of insulation are used around the piping, but which, by reason of the rapid decay and disintegration of the covering, insures only very short life of the work.

The entire power plant and heating system was designed by Mr. Charles L. Reeder, of Baltimore, Md., and installed under his supervision as Consulting Engineer for the University.

COMMENCEMENT EXERCISES, 1911.

On Wednesday morning, June 7, the Annual Conferring of Degrees and Commencement Exercises of the University took place in McMahon Hall, in the presence of His Excellency, the Most Rev. Diomede Falconio, Apostolic Delegate. The Rt. Rev. Thomas J. Shahan, Rector of the University, delivered the principal address, and the Delegate closed the exercises with benediction.

The Deans of the several schools of the University presented the following students for degrees:

In the School of Sacred Sciences, for the degree of Bachelor of Sacred Theology (S. T. B.): Rev. Dominic Joseph Cannon, of the Congregation of the Holy Cross; Rev. Wendell Phillips Corcoran, of the Congregation of the Holy Cross; Rev. Patrick Francis Crawley, of Scranton, Pa.; Rev. Edward Patrick Dalton, of Albany, N. Y.; Rev. Aloysius Charles Dineen, of New York, N. Y.; Rev Sigourney Webster Fay, of Baltimore, Md.; Rev. John Joseph Finn, of Albany, N. Y.; Rev. Michael Ambrose Gilloegly, of Scranton, Pa.; Rev. William Anthony Hemmick, of Baltimore, Md.; Rev. Francis Henry Kehlenbrink, of St. Louis, Mo.; Rev. William Peter McNally, of Philadelphia, Pa.; Rev. Joseph Aloysius Nelson, of New York, N. Y.; Brother James O'Keefe, of the Order of St. Benedict; Rev. James Francis Palmowski, of the Marist Congregation; Rev. Joseph Michael Sullivan, of the Marist Congregation; Rev. John Paul Ritchie of St. Louis, Mo.; Rev. Andrew Aloysius Walls, of the Marist Congregation; Brother Celestine Smith, of the Order of St. Benedict.

For the degree of Licentiate in Sacred Theology (S. T. L.):

Rev. Walter Thomas Bazaar, of Albany, N. Y.; Dissertation: The Power of the Human Reason to Know God; a Critical Defense.

Rev. Eugene Paul Burke, of the Congregation of the Holy Cross; Dissertation: Some Notes on the Christology of St. Paul.

Rev. Robert Emmet B. Gardiner, of Scranton, Pa.; Dissertation: Pope Leo XIII and Anglican Orders.

Rev. John Francis Georgelin, of the Marist Congregation; Dissertation: The Authority of the Vulgate according to the Council of Trent.

Rev. Michael Joseph Keyes, of the Marist Congregation; Dissertation: The Doctrine of the Church on Frequent Communion.

Rev. Francis Michael O'Reilly, of New York, N. Y.; Dissertation: The Catholic Doctrine of Atonement: a Reply to A. Sabatier.

Rev. John Michael Ryan, of the Congregation of the Holy Cross; Dissertation: The Social and Economic Teaching of Clement of Alexandria.

Rev. John Carter Smith, of the Paulist Congregation; Dissertation: Substitution, and the Doctrine of Atonement.

For the degree of Bachelor of Canon Law (J. C. B.):

Rev. John Ignatius Barret, of Baltimore, Md.; Rev. Walter Thomas Bazaar, of Albany, N. Y.; Rev. Andrew Joseph Carroll, of San Francisco, Cal.; Rev. Edward Patrick Dalton, of Albany, N. Y.; Rev. Aloysius Charles Dineen, of New York, N. Y.; Rev. Thomas Joseph Finnegan, of Sioux City, Iowa; Rev. Michael Galvin, of Los Angeles, Cal.; Rev. William Humphries, of Baltimore, Md.; Rev. Felix McCarthy, of Omaha, Neb.; Rev. Thomas Ligouri McEntee, of Harrisburg, Pa.; Rev. Leo Ligouri McVay, of Providence, R. I.; Rev. Thomas Aloysius Needham, of Scranton, Pa.; Rev. Thomas Joseph Toolen, of Baltimore, Md.

In the School of Law, for the degree of Doctor of Law (J. D.): Joseph Lepaspi Villaflor, of Manila, P. I.; Dissertation: The Authority and Sanction of International Law.

In the School of Philosophy, for the degree of Doctor of

Philosophy (Ph. D.): Rev. Cornelius Joseph Hagerty, of the Congregation of the Holy Cross; Dissertation: The Problem of Evil.

Rev. Patrick Joseph McCormick, of Norwich, Conn.; Dissertaion: The Education of the Laity in the Middle Ages.

Rev. Patrick Joseph Waters, of Boston, Mass.; Dissertation: Studies in the Principle of Apperception.

Rev. Virgil Daeger, of the College of the Holy Land; Dissertation: The Origin, Primitive Meaning and History of the Dagesh Forte.

Rev. Francis Xavier O'Neill, of the Order of St. Dominic; Dissertation: Some Aspects of the Medieval Miracle Play.

For the degree of Bachelor of Philosophy (Ph. B.):

Louis Joseph Bour, of the Paulist Congregation.

For the degree of Master of Arts (A. M.):

Rev. Daniel Joseph MacDonald, of Antigonish, Nova Scotia; Dissertation: Radicalism and Some English Poetry of the Nineteenth Century.

William Augustus Maguire, of South Bethlehem, Pa.; Dissertation: On the Fate Passages in the First Three Books of the Aeneid of Virgil.

For the degree of Bachelor of Arts (A. B.): Timothy Vincent O'Donnell, of Albion, N. Y.; John Joseph Daly, of Phoebus, Va.

For the degree of Bachelor of Science (B. S.): James Joseph Boillin, of Clarksville, Tenn.; John James Cantwell, of Washington, D. C., in Electrical Engineering; Thomas Hackman Carter, of Washington, D. C.; Joseph Roland Devries, of Arlington, Md.; Charles Stephen McCarthy, of Brookland, D. C., in Civil Engineering; Peter Leo McGeady, of Wanamie, Pa.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

The University Summer School for Teaching Sisters and women teachers has proved a great success. The registration has reached very nearly three hundred, by far the greater number being Sisters. They come from nearly forty States of the Union and from points as far apart as Oregon, Florida, Texas, Louisiana, Minnesota and other States. Some twenty-five religious orders and congregations are represented and about sixty independent houses. The University buildings have been placed at their disposal, and several of them serve as convents. A number of Sisters also reside in Trinity College and others in various convents in the city. All classes are conducted in McMahon Hall, whose excellent equipment was never more serviceable than at present. The students of the Summer School are all enthusiastic over the opening of the University during the vacation months to our Teaching Sisters and women teachers and it seems quite certain that a successful future is assured to the School. The professors are 25 in number and all the branches usually taught in a summer school of the highest order are well represented. During the recent excessive heats Washington was particularly favored and the health of the Sisters remained very satisfactory. The University grounds are considerably higher than the rest of the city and constitute a very agreeable park-like reservation. Immediately adjoining is the Soldier's Home with its splendid park of some seven hundred acres. No more agreeable or healthy situation could be found for this great work. The Sisters continue to live precisely as they would in their own convents at home, observing with great exactness all their religious exercises. On Sundays there is a Solemn High Mass with a sermon in the University chapel and during the week they have frequent Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament. Classes are conducted regularly from 8 to 1 and from 3 to 6.

Many classes are very largely attended, so that the capacity of McMahon Hall is seriously taxed. On Saturday July 8th, all the students visited Mount Vernon and placed a beautiful wreath on the tomb of George Washington. They were very cordially received by the Superintendent of the grounds who showed them personally over the historic site. On Thursday, July 13th, the entire School was received at the White House by President Taft, who shook hands with each Sister and congratulated all most heartily on their good work. Public lectures, frequently illustrated, are given several evenings in the week by speakers of distinction in the Assembly Room, McMahon Hall. It may be said without exaggeration that through this School the University is entering on a new and larger field of usefulness. Hitherto it opened the way to a higher education for the sons of our Catholic people, but henceforth its advantages are open also to their daughters, and to the noblest and most devoted among them, those chosen souls who have given themselves entirely to Jesus Christ and the spread of His kingdom.

Department of Electrical Engineering. The following gifts are acknowledged:—

1. National Carbon Co., Cleveland, Ohio:—One exhibit of samples of their various carbon products.

2. John A. Roebling Sons Co., Trenton, N. J. One set of sample insulated wire and cables.

3. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co., Pittsburg, Pa. Six framed photos (24″ x 30″) of Westinghouse apparatus.

The above gifts, are located in the quarters of the Engineering Department in the new Engineering Building.